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Abstract 
This study comprehensively reviews theoretical and empirical 
literature pertaining to leveraged buyouts. An agency theory 
framework best descr·ibes the source of LBO value creation. 
Agency conflicts are mitigated through extensive utilisation 
of debt capital and concentrated equity ownership, which are 
functions of asset and organisation structures. The evidence 
generally supports the hypothesis that economic wealth is 
created by leveraged buyouts, rather than merely 
redistributed among stakeholders. 
This thesis uses a multiple case design to examine leveraged 
buyouts in Australia. It compiles data from a broad range of 
public and private sources, and conducts qualitative and 
quantitative analysis on six (6) leveraged buyouts. 
Case re~ults indicate that industry and business attributes 
synonymous with US and UK buyouts are important determinants 
of Austral.i.an leveraged buyouts. Business attributes ar·e the 
primary motivating farces. Ownership structures comply with 
foreign expectations, and capital structures are more 
closely aligned with those reported in UK research. 
Industry adjusted performance was analysed for a subset of 
three (3) leveraged buyouts with post-buyout periods of 
sufficient duration. Profit margins and capital utilisation 
exceeded industry medians in each post-buyout year, for each 
-3 
leve~aged buyout. Cost control, rather than increased sales, 
accounted for most gains. Australian buyouts did not manage 
working capital effectively~ a result which contrasts 
markedly with US and UK levE?raged buyouts. 
The evidence from the Australian leveraged buyouts analysed 
in this thesis is consistent with an agency theory 
framework. 
.. 
4 
Declaration 
I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without 
acknowledgement any material previously ~ubmitted for a 
degree or diploma in any institution of higher education; 
and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not 
contain any material previously published or written by 
another person except where due reference is made in the 
text. 
Date. , l3:\\:~~ . •••. , .....••• , ••••.. 
.. 
5 
Acknowledgements 
The author is indebted to the following managers, directors, 
financial executive~ and a~ademics, for releasing financial 
data that forms the basis of this thesis; 
Ivan James (Automotive Components Limited), N. Donnelly 
(Automotive Components Limited), John Meacock (Campbell 
Capital [WA] Limited), Duncan Calder (KPMG Peat Marwick) 
Alan Kendrick (AIDC Ltd, Syt!ney), Dan Smetana (Joyce 
Corporation Limited), Paul Wright (Centurion Industries 
Limited), Ray Anderson (Victoria University of Technology), 
Albie EJrooks (Victoria University of Technology), and a 
former senior banking executive who prefers to remain 
anwnymous. 
I am especially indebted to my supel~visor, Graeme Robson, 
whose wealth of banking and ~esea~ch expe~ience p~ovided 
many useful comments and suggestions. 
/ 
Abstract 
Declaration 
Acknowledgements 
List of Tables 
List of Figur-es 
Chapter 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Table of Contents 
6 
Page 
2 
4 
5 
9 
10 
11 
A Historical Perspective;! on Leveraged Buyouts 11 
2 
3 
4 
United States 11 
United Kingdom 15 
Australia 19 
The Purpose and Significance of the Study 
The Research Problem 
Outline of the Study 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theory 
Capital Structun? and Corporate Control 
Asset Structure 
Organisation Structure 
Evidence 
Industry and Company Characteristics 
Corporate Restr·ucturing 
Economic Wealth versus Redistribution 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Scope 
Variables 
METHODOLOGY 
Design 
Data Collection 
Data An.alysis 
Limitations 
21 
23 
23 
25 
25 
25 
36 
39 
42 
43 
48 
53 
76 
76 
77 
80 
80 
81 
82 
82 
7 
Page 
5 CENTURION INDUSTRIES LIMITED 84 
Background 84 
Industry Characteristics 84 
Business Attributes of the Tar-get Company 86 
Equity Ownership 87 
Capita 1 Structure 89 
Financial Performance 90 
6 JOYCE CORPORATION LIMITED 94 
Background 94 
Industry Char-acter-istics 94 
Business Attributes of the Target Company 95 
Equity Ownership 97 
Capital Structure 98 
Financial Performance 99 
7 AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS LIMITED 103 
Background 103 
Industry Characteristics 103 
Business Attributes of the Target Company 104 
Equity Ownership 106 
> Capital Structure 107 
1 Financial Performance 108 
.1 
8 LEIGH-MAROON PTY LTD 112 
Background 112 
Industry Characteristics 112 
Business Attributes of the Target Company 114 
Equity Ownership 116 
Capital Structure 117 
9 McEWANS LIMITED 121 
Background 121 
Industry and Business Character-istics 121 
Equity Ownership 123 
Capital Structure 124 
c. 
10 
11 
12 
ADVENTURE WORLD 
Backgr-ound 
Industr-y Characteristics 
Business Attributes of the Target 
Equity Ownership 
Capital Structure 
SUMMARY AND COf\ICLUS I ON 
FUTU1~E RESEARCH ON AUSTRALIAN LEOs 
Organisation Str-ucture 
The Legal and Institutional Framework 
8 
Page 
127 
127 
127 
129 
130 
130 
132 
138 
138 
139 
REFERENCES 141 
APPENDIX A 154 
Perfor-mance Ratios Used in LBO Case Studies 154 
APPENDIX 8 155 
Firm and Industr·y Ratios 155 
0. 
List of Tables 
Tables 
2.1 Leve~aged Buyout Intensity Ratios 
2.2 Mean Debt Ratios Framing LBO 
2.3 Average Stock Premiums in LBOs 
2.4 Projected RJR Nabisco Tax Effects 
4.1 Case Study ASX Industry Reports 
5.1 Centurion Equity Ownership 
5.2 Centurion C~sh Cycle 
6.1 Joyce Equity Ownership 
6.2 Joyce Debt/Assets Ratios 
6.3 Joyce Cash Cycle 
7.1 ACL Equity Ownership 
7,2 ACL Cash Cycle 
6.1 Leigll-Mardon Equity Ownership 
9.1 McEwans Equity Ownership 
8.1 CGnturion Industries Limited Ratios 
8.2 Joyce Corporation Limited Ratios 
B.3 Automotive Components Limited Ratios 
8.4 Engineering Industry (Median) Ratios 
8.5 Miscellaneous Industrials (Median) Ratios 
9 
Page 
44 
50 
54 
67 
81 
88 
92 
97 
99 
101 
106 
110 
117 
123 
155 
155 
156 
156 
157 
10 
List of Figures 
Figures Page 
1.1 us LBO Financing 13 
1.2 us LBO Market 16 
1.3 UK LBO Market 18 
1.4 Austr-alian LBO Market 21 
2.1 Number of US Buyouts 52 
2.2 Number of UK Buyouts 52 
2.3 R&D Intensity 74 
5.1 Centurion EBIT Ratios 91 
6.1 Joyce EBIT Ratios 100 
7.1 ACL EBIT Ratios 108 
8.1 Leigh-Mardon Packaging Division Sales 115 
8.2 Leigh-Mardon Communication and 
/ 
Security Division Sales 116 
8.3 Leigh-Mardon Pro Forma Financial Capitalisation 119 
8.4 Leigh-Mardon Pro Forma Market Capitalisation 119 
10.1 Adventure Wor·ld Attendances by Season 178 
10.2 Adventure World Attendances by Client 130 
11.1 Case Study EBIT/S~les Ratios 135 
11.2 Case Study Cash Cycles 137 
11 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Lever-aged buyouts are transactions wher-e pr-ivate 
investor-s use predominantly debt financing to pur-chase a 
corporation or a division thereof (Palepu, 1990). The 
investor group usually compr~ses incumbent m~nagement and a 
leveraged buyout specialist (Easterwood, Seth & Singer, 
1989) . 
This intr-oduction outlines the historical development 
of leveraged buyout mar-kets in the United States, the United 
Kingdom und Austr-alia; it explains the study's pur-pose, and 
enumerates the resear-ch questions that constitute this 
thesis. 
1.1 A Historical Perspective on Leveraged Buyouts 
The leveraged buyout movement originated with 
'bootstrap' acquisitions in the 1960s, where under 
capitalised buyers used the target's cash flow and assets to 
fund acquisitions. The buyouts were small by present 
standards and typically involved distressed private 
companies. Senior secured funds were advanced on the basis 
of asset backing, with equity capital forming the balance 
(Burke & Fite, 1990). 
The subsequent development of a subordinated debt 
market, arranged as private pla~ements, accorded leveraged 
buyouts more flexibility and increased the transaction size 
range (Burke & Fite, i990), Less stringent indenture 
12 
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provisions facilitated bid prem1ums in excess of book value. 
That is, subordinated debt emphasised cash flow generation 
rather than asset security. 
Large returns from lever·aged buyo~t transactions 
induced the establishment of dedicated LBQ partnerships. 
Gibbons Green van Amerongen (1969), Thomas H Lee (1974), 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (1976), Clayton & Dubilier (1976) 
and Butler Capital (1979) were early LBO specialists 
(Jensen, 1989). 
During the late 1970s, the trend toward conglomeration 
was reversed by inflation and changes in acquisition 
accounting. Companies divested non-core assets to reduce 
working capital and overhead costs, and to supplement 
depressed operating earnings. Divestiture programmes 
released quality divisions and subsidiaries at the time when 
leveraged buyouts emerged as a viable alternative to 
traditional trade buyers (Whitman & Knowles, 1990). 
The $370M leveraged buyout of Houdaille Industries Inc. 
by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts in 1979, was the first 
significant public company buyout, f1eralding a new era in 
leveraged buyout activity. 
In 1994, public high yield (junk) bonds were issued as 
subordinated debt in leveraged buyouts. Leveraged buyout 
junk bonds comprised 271. of the new issuance high yield 
market between 1983 and 1989 (Figure 1.1), 
Introduction 
Figure 1.1 
US lBO FINANCING 
lililllons $ 60,-~~----------------------~----------~ 
Iii!!!! Junk lilonda IZ22l Other 
Sour<!&: Paulus A Waita (1990) 
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Public high yield bonds contributed to the development 
of the leveraged buyout market by securitising subordinated 
debt. Securi tisation improved marlcetabili ty and reduced 
interest costs (Perry & Taggart, 1990). Volatile interest 
rates shifted investor preferences from private placements 
to public high yield bonds, because secondary markets grant 
public investors the right to sell subordinated debt prior 
to maturation (Loeys, 1990). 
Furthermore, the returnjrisk characteristics of high 
yield securities attracted new capital into the subordinated 
debt market. High yield securities have shorter duration 
than investment grade debt of equivalent maturity, hence 
junk bonds have less price sensitivity to interest rates 
(Perry & Taggart, 1990). Yield premiums were believed to 
Introduction 
more than compensate for- the additional default risl:. 
(Altman, 1990a). 
14 
The regulatory and legislative fra.mework enhanced 
demand for high yield securities. The National Bank Act and 
the Glass-Steagell Act prevented commc1 cial banks from 
holding large blocks of corporate stock. The Investment 
Company Act limited life ~nsuranc~ companies and mutual 
funds to 27. and 101. of a compar s stock, respectively 
(8erglof, 1991). High yield securities exhibited equity-like 
returns and had no statutory limits. 
Therefore, lar-ge amounts of subordinated debt were 
available at short not:!.ce for leveragee! buyouts. As purchase 
multiples increased, new securities contingent on asset 
sales or cash flow improvements were d~vised, such as 
deferred interest securities (payment-in-kind debt, PIK 
preferred stock, and deep discount zero coupon bonds), and 
in'ct-easing rate notes (Levi&. Bencivenga, 1990). The 
extensive use of subordinated securities afforded senior 
bank debt more asset protection (Burke & Fite, 1990). 
Competition induced investment banks and LBO 
partnerships to commit their capital to reduce deal 
completion tim~s. Bridge loans advance funds that are 
eventually retired with the proceeds of a public high yield 
issue. Hence, registration delays inherent in public debt 
offerings occur after the deal has closed (Burke & Fite, 
1990) . 
.. 
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In addition, the syndication time required for the 
equity component in large leveraged buyouts was eliminated 
by the creation of dedicated LBO funds. By mid-1988, an 
estimated $258 had be8n invested in LBO equity funds, and 
given debt ratios of 90%, this provided the basis for 
leveraged buyout financing of approximately $2508 (Kuhn, 
1990). 
Therefore, liquid subordinated debt and dedicated LBO 
equity funds reduced the remaining encumbrances on the 
transaction size range of leveraged buyouts. In 1989, RJR 
Nabisco became the largest leveraged buyout ever performed, 
being valued at $258. 
The US leveraged buyout market f~xperienced a 
considerable decline in activity during 1990 and 1991. 
Figure 1.2 reflects the extent to which bUyouts have 
suffered from a financing drought. 
The present shortage of LBO debt finance is a function 
of weakness in the economy, Federal Reserve pressure on 
commercial bank loan portfolios, and a liquidity crisis in 
the junk bond market. 
United Kingdom. 
Although the leveraged buyout market commenced in the 
late 1970s, the economic recession of 1981 and 1982 provided 
the impetus for LBO market development. Difficult operating 
conditions resulted in numerous receiverships and motivated 
corporate divestiture programmes, which supplied the buyout 
16 
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marl\:et with a range of potential targets (Wright, Thompson, 
Chiplin, & Robbie, 1991). 
Figure 1.2 
US LBO MARKET 
10 ;:~='ll=lo=ns~$~----------------------------------. 
50~·-·································································································· 
40~---······················································· 
30~---······················································· 
20~---··························::o=···· 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 191'17 1988 1989 1990 1991 
l!il!il LBO Deal Value 
sour<Ja: M&A Ah'll&nae, 26{1), 1992. 
The flat stockmarket deterred private companies and 
public (government) trading enterprises from transferring 
ownership through initial public offerings, hence, leveraged 
buyouts became a viable medium for maximising sale proceeds 
(Wright et al., 1991b). 
Modifications to the Companies Act allowed firms to 
extend financial assistance to purchasers of their stock, 
and grant creditors recourse to target company assets in the 
event of default (Wright, Thompson & Robbie, 1992; Wright et 
al., 199lb). These factors are significant to leveraged 
buyouts with management or employee equity ownership, and 
when shell companies are used to complete the transaction. 
17 
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The rapid growth in venture capital markets during the 
1980s promoted concomitant growth in leveraged buyouts. 
Venture capitalists allocated, on average~ over 50/. of their 
loan portfolio to leveraged buyouts (1988, 1989), more than 
double the ratio advanced in the United States (Wright et 
al., 1991a). 
The mezzanine market mainly comprises subordinated debt 
in loan form, ~ith attached common stock warrants or other 
equity kickers (Levi & Bencivenga, 1990), Pension funds, 
insurance companies and commercial banks are not large 
investors in the mezzanir.e market, which restricts the 
availability of subordinated debt and the flexibility of 
leveraged buyouts. 
LBO specialist firms were established, partly in 
response to the presence of US investment banks in London. 
LBO mezzanine and equity capital funds emerged in 1986, and 
when combined with improved senior debt syndication, this 
increased the total value of leveraged buyout transactions 
(Figure 1.3). Furthermore, several commercial banks created 
development capital subsidiaries to improve their buyout 
capabilities. 
The British government's privatisation programme has 
been a strong source of leveraged buyouts. Since National 
Freight, in 1982, there has been over one hundred and twenty 
public sector leveraged buyouts (Wright et al., 1991b). 
Employee led buyouts have occurred in Local Authority 
Introduction 
privatisations as employees and trade unions seek to 
guarantee long term employment. 
Figure 1. 3 
UK LBO MARKET 
SrBi~lli=o=M~G=B=P----------------------------------, 
6~----····························································································································· 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
!\!!lll! LBO Deal Value 
Souroa: Wright &t mi .• 1991b 
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The GBP 60M Haden deal in 1985, was the first public 
company leveraged buyout in the United Kingdom. "Going 
private" buyouts form a minority of total transactions (1%), 
however, they account for a more substantial proportion of 
total value (17%). The largest UK buyout is the GBP 2.2B 
Gateway acquisition completed in 1989 (Levi & Bencivenga, 
1991; Wright et al., 1991b). 
Divestitures and private (family) company leveraged 
buyouts represent the major proportion of total activity, at 
68% and 21% respectively (Wright et al., 199lb). The former 
reflects the reversal of diversification policies instituted 
Introduction 
in the 1970s, and the latter, the need to deal with 
succession problems (Wright et al., 1992). 
Australia. 
19 
The Australian leveraged buyout market originated in 
the early 1980s. The paucity of domestic research prevents a 
comprehensive review of the market's development, however, 
the following factors had some influence over the growth in 
leveraged buyout utilisation in Australia. 
Australia had a comparatively high inflation rate for 
most of the 1980s, creating a bias toward debt capital, 
since asset accretion exceeded debt servicing cost 
increases. In addition, a relatively high corporat2 tax rate 
mitigated the after tax cost of debt. 
The success of foreign leveraged buyouts educated 
financial professionals and managers in the potential 
applications of the concept in Australia. Several LBO 
specialist firm's were established in the mid-1980s, 
including DBSM (SBC Dominguez Barry), Byvest, AIDC and BLE 
Capital. 
The leveraged buyout market received a tremendous boost 
when Australian banking licences were granted to sixteen 
foreign banks in February 1985. The improved av~ilability of 
senior debt capital at competitive rates, from banking 
institutions familiar with buyouts~ advanced the LBO market 
in Australia. 
Dedic~ted LBO funds were created to procure mezzanine 
and equity capital. Known examples are DBSM mezzanine and 
0. 
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equity funds, and Fulc~um (a fund established by Western 
Capital). However, the mezzanine market in Australia 
comprises private loans from institutions and therefore, 
suffers from illiquidity and size limitations. 
The Australian corporate bond market may overcame the 
above restrictions. ThG market grew from $0-$58 in 18 
months, with various issues and maturities, and at 
attractive premiums to semi-government securities. Although 
the market is only available for blue chips at present, low 
grade credits may follow. DBSM commit truding and 
distribution resources to the corporate bond market, which 
is somewhat analogous to Drexel Burnham Lambert's promotion 
of junk bonds in the United States (Bruck, 1989). 
Brooks (1992) notes that there has been approximately 
75 leveraged buyouts in Australia between 1983 and 1990. 
Figure 1.4 exhibits the growth in the value of Australian 
buyouts exceeding $10M. 
The two largest leveraged buyouts in Australia are 
Leigh-Mar-don Pty Ltd and McEwans Limited, which are examined 
in detail in Chapters Eight and Nine, respectively. 
The privatisation of government owned enterprises 
offers a source of growth for the leveraged buyout industry 
in the 1990s. Labor and Liberal governments at Federal and 
State levels have indicated their interest in public sector 
asset sales. 
Millions$ 
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Figure l.4 
AUSTRALIAN LBO MARKET 
aoo,---------------------------------------. 
5oor------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4oor---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
aoor-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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toor-------------------------------------------------------------------
198a 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
_IR LBO Deal Value 
acuroa: BrooM, 1992. 
1.2 The PUrpose and Significance of the Study 
21 
The purpose of this thesis is to gain an insight into 
the Australian leveraged buyout phenomenon. The thesis seeks 
to establish whether leveraged buyout theories reported in 
foreign empirical research apply to the Australian market. 
Australian leveraged buyout research of this type is 
both timely and significant. The preceding section outlined 
the exponential growth in LBO transaction value in Australia 
during the 1980s, and with the lowest interest rates in a 
decade, a perception that the worst of the recession is 
over, and the potential for public sector privatisations, 
the 1990s could generate a resurgence in domestic buyout 
demand. 
c. 
' 
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Leveraged buyouts are a contempDrary financial 
innovation th8t challenge preconceived notions of how 
business should be conducted, They have had a significant 
impact on the US and UK manufacturing sectors (Waite & 
Fridsan, 1989; Wright et al., 1991b). 88tween 1979/90, 
America's manufacturing output per worker-hour grew at 3.6/. 
p.a., tripling the 1970s rate. Manufacturing contribution to 
GNP increased from 20/. (1982) to 23% (1990), matching the 
halcyon days of the 1960s (They will return, 1991). 
Similarly, the annual average productivity increase in 
British manufacturing grew from 2/. in 1972/79, to 4/. in 
1979/89 (To the victor these spoils, 1990). Accordingly, 
leveraged buyouts may have a role in restructuring the 
Australian manufacturing sector, making information 
discovery via empirical research important. 
Research on Australian leveraged buyouts may indicate 
the extent to which foreign experiences have been replicated 
here. This thesis undertakes a comprehensive review of the 
literature pertai~1ing to US and UK leveraged buyouts, and 
empirically tests Australian cases for evidence that 
supports or refutes theory. Establishing the theoretical 
framework which applies to the Australian LBO market is a 
logica~ first step that should facilitate the development of 
further buyout research. 
"· 
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1.3 The Research Problem 
This research is believed to be the first of its kind 
in Australia. The research problem this thesis seeks to 
resolve is: 
''Do Australian leveraged buyouts comply with expectations 
derived from foreign (US & UK) leveraged buyout markets''? 
The following research questions provide a systematic 
means for analysing actual Australian leveraged buyouts in a 
real-lite (as distinct from a laboratory) context: 
(i) Are industry characteristics of Australian leveraged 
buyouts consistent with those reported in the US and UK? 
(ii) Are business attributes of LBO target companies 
conducive to leveraged buyouts? 
(iii) Do leveraged buyouts concentrate equity ownership 
among directors, managers, employees and LBO specialists? 
(ivl Are Australian leveraged buyouts as extensively geared 
as those reported in the US and UK? 
(v) How have leveraged buyout companies performed in the 
post-buyout period? 
1.4 Outljoe 
Chapter Two critically reviews theoretical a~d 
empirical research on leveraged buyouts. Chapter Three 
outlines the scope of the thesis and identifies variables; 
which provide the terms of reference for methodology 
developed in Chapter Four. Chapters Five through to Ten 
comprise case studies on Australian leveraged buyouts; and 
Chapter Eleven summarises and concludes the paper. Chapter 
0. 
24 
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Twelve suggests topics for future research on Australian 
leveraged buyouts. Appendix A defines the r-atios used in the 
case studies. 
0. 
Literature Review 
CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Theory 
25 
Theoretical research on leveraged buyouts purports to 
explain the source of value created in the buyout process. 
This has important consequences for managers, LBO 
specialists and financial institutions intending to 
capitalise on the selection and restructuring of buyout 
targets; and for academics and policy-makers concerned with 
the distribution of wealth. 
The theoretical review outlines how changes to capital 
and ownership structures reduce agency costs and increase 
entrepreneurial incentives for managers. Subsequent 
revisions to asset and organisation structures reinforce 
comparative advantage and operating efficiency. 
Resea~ch cited in this chapte~ is the foundation f~om 
which the theo~etical f~amework is de~ived (Chapte~ Th~ee) 
and empi~ical results are referenced. The degree of 
homogeneity between domestic and foreign (US & UK) buyouts 
may then be inferred. 
2,Ll Capital Structure and Corporate Control 
Leve~aged buyouts are characterised by simultaneo~s 
changes to the capital and ownership structures of the 
entity. The capital structure is reconstituted to maximise 
debt utilisation, and financial claims on the fi~m's assets 
are concentrated in incumbent managerial and institutir.:~nal 
c. 
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portfolios. How do these revisions propose to increase firm 
value? 
A traditional Modigliani-Miller corporate tax approach 
implies leveraged buyouts exploit the tax deductibility of 
interest rayments to reduce the firm's cost of capital. The 
increased cost of equity capital attributable to leverage 
induced financial risk does not perfectly offset the use of 
'cheaper· debt (Copeland & Weston, 1988). Therefore, the 
optimal capital structure consists entirely of debt. 
Modigliani and Miller implicitly assumed personal taxes 
on debt and equity were identical (Brealey & Myers, 1988). 
Differential personal taxes levied on debt and equity, and 
other sources of taxation deductions moderate the extreme 
all debt solution. 
The tax timing option granted to stockholders, and tax 
credits on dividends paid by taxable corpo~ations, 
disadvantage debt holders. To overcome the relative tax 
penalty corporations offer higher pre-tax returns an debt 
instruments. The equilibrium market return is determined by 
gr-assing-up a tax-free insti tutian' s r-etu:~n by the corporate 
tax rate. Ther-efor-e, most of the interest tax subsidy is 
lost (Miller, cite~ 1 Copeland & Weston, 1988). 
Depreciation and other deductions also dilute the 
taxation benefits of debt. That is, demand for- interest tax 
shields is inversely related to the availability of 
substitutes, given earnings must be generated to b~nefit 
c. 
Literature Review 27 
from tax shelters (DeAngelo & Masulis, cited in Copeland et 
al. , 1988) • 
Miller concludes that the taxation advantage of debt is 
neutralised such that firm value remains independent of 
capital structure, This thesis prefers the more realistic 
DeAngelo-Masulis (Copeland et al ., 1988) extension which 
accounts for differential effective corporate tax rates. 
Companies with high effective tax rates may reduce their 
cost of capital through judicious leveraging. 
The preceding theorems are important to this research 
because they demonstrate Lhat superficial inspection of 
capital structure will not explain how leveraged buyouts 
increase firm value. High effective tax rates may be one of 
numerous explanatory factors. 
Subsequent research relaxed Modigliani-Miller 
assumptions pertaining to bankruptcy costs, cash flow 
distributions and management wealth incentives. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the combination 
of bankruptcy costs and the corporate tax subsidy on 
interest payments affects the probability distribution of 
future cash flows. The Modigliani-Miller assumption that the 
probability distribution of future cash flows is independent 
of capital structure is invalid where the probability of 
bankruptcy is positively correlated with relative debt 
levels. Agency theory provides a rationale for value 
creation in leveraged buyouts by evaluating the impact of 
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capital and ownership structures on the firm's future cash 
flow distribution. 
An agency relationship exists when principals 
(stockholders) engage an agent (managers) to perform a 
service on their behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Decision-
making discretion is granted to agents as part of the 
fiduciary agreement. Centralised management teams facilitate 
specialisation and reduce negotiating and bargaining costs 
(Anderson, 1978). However, the separation of ownership and 
control results in divergent wealth maximisation incentives. 
Leveraged buyouts capitalise on dispar-ity between the 
cost of concentrating diffuse ownership and potential for 
agency cost savings (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
proportion of debt financing in the capital structure is the 
key element in a leveraged buyout's ability to reduce agency 
costs. Debt enables entrepreneurial managers with limited 
personal resources to acquire significant equity in the 
company; and guards against an over-retentive dividend 
policy. Ownership of debt claims accord financial 
institutions greater control over their investments whilst 
complying with the regulatory framework. 
Leveraged buyout5 align managerial wealth incentives 
with stockholders by concentrating equity ownership. Since 
equity represents a small proportion of the reconstituted 
capital structure, managers and LBO specialists may acquire 
significant equity interests. The balance is held in a 
•• 
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limited number of institutional portfolios as part of a 
strip financing package. 
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Concentrating equity ownership has two advantages: 
(i) Managerial wealth dependence on residual claims on the 
firm's assets motivate policies which maximise cash flow. 
fl'lanage>r-s have less incentive to consume perquisites since 
they bear significant personal losses when firm value 
declines. 
(ii) Corporate governance by LBO specialists ensures cash 
flow maximisation does not emanate from opportunistic 
managerial activity, but from enhanced operating capability. 
The specialist's wealth is negatively affected by short-term 
managerial decisions thaf satisfy immediate bonus plan 
objectives at the expense of future value. In addition, the 
specialist's success at protecting institutional clients 
will determine their amenability to future buyout 
investments. 
Therefore, substantial managerial equity ownership 
aligns personal wealth maximisation incentives with firm 
value, reducing agency costs. Enhanced corporate governance 
exerts control over activities not covered by contracts 
(Berglof, 1991). 
The lack of correlation between executive pay and 
performance (Jensen & Murphy, 1990); and managerial 
preference for internal financing (Brealey & Myers, 1988) 
encourages con5ervative dividend policy. The retention of 
cash flow beyond that required to fund positive net present 
•• 
Literature Review 30 
value projects (free cash flow) is a result of managers 
desire to maximise their utility and secure independence 
from capital market monitoring (Jensen, 1986). 
Leverage reduces agency costs of free cash flow by 
stipulating distribution of cash otr.erwise available for 
discretionary spending (Jensen, 1986). The economic 
implication is that free cash flow disbursed by corporations 
is reallocated by investors (according to their risk/return 
profile) to the highest valued use. The capital market 
exerts greater control over subsequent capital expenditure 
due to veto power over company submissions for project 
funding. 
Therefore, leveraged buyouts motivate and discipline 
managerial behaviour (Easterwood, Seth & Singer, 1989) 
through direct stock ownership and corporate governance. 
Onerous principal and interest obligations make cash flow 
generation the prime objective. 
The beneficial effects from increasing leverage may be 
curtailed by agency costs of debt. This concerns the 
potential expropriation of wealth from debt holders as a 
result of managers fiduciary relationship with stockholders. 
Leveraged buyouts control agency costs of debt through 
concentrated debt ownership, protective indenture 
provisions, and innovative financing techniques. 
The importance of concentrated debt ownership in 
leveraged buyouts has not been articulated in the 
literature. Senior debt syndicated by banks typically 
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dominate leveraged buyout capital structures (Easterwood et 
al., 1989; Burke & Fite, 1990; Vernick, 1991). This thesis 
suggests corporate governance exercised by the senior debt 
conso1~tium is more effective at binding the specialist to 
maximise firm, as opposed to equity value, than notions of 
foregone carry (Easterwood et al., 1989) or 'reputation 
effects' (Easterwood et al., 1989; Jensen, 1989). Senior 
debt concentration combined with indenture provisions (Baker 
& Wruck, 1989) prevent dominant stockholders from 
transferring value. 
Indenture provisions alleviate conflicts of interest 
between debt and equity holders by limiting default risk to 
the level priced when the debt was issued. "The . • effect 
of [debt] covenants is to restrict , the source of 
funds for scheduled interest and principal repayments and 
the use of funds in excess of • [that] amount'' (Saker & 
Wruck, 1989, p. 170). Standardisation of indenture 
provisions cost effectively reduces monitoring and bonding 
c.:~sts. 
Agency costs of debt are also mitigated by innovative 
strip and convertible debt financing techniques. Conflicts 
of interest among security holders are overcome by selling 
portfolios comprising subordinated securities in mezzanine 
strips. Strip holders receive rights to intercede in the 
leveraged buyout as each security defaults, and accordingly, 
have little incentive to transfer wealth (Jensen, 1986). 
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Convertible debt relieves cash flow demands on 
leverag~d buyouts and enables participation in prospective 
shifts in the return distribution. Attempts to expropriate 
wealth from debt holders may be avoided through conversion. 
Agency costs of debt include direct legal costs, 
foregone warranties and services (Rappaport, 1990; Copeland 
& Weston, 1988) and labour specificity problems (Libecap, 
1988) associated with bankruptcy. Derivative instruments 
moderate bankruptcy risk, for example: floating rate 
exposure may be capped by interest rate put options, short 
hedged with interest rate futures contracts, or swapped for 
net fixed rate exposure. Therefore, leveraged buyouts 
support levels of debt previously consid~red infeasible. 
The proportion of debt in leveraged buyouts facilitates 
the transfer of corporate control in low performance states 
of nature (Berglof, 1991). This is analogous to Jensen's 
(1989, p. 73) "Privatisation of Bankruptcy", where control 
passes to creditors when indenture provisions are breached 
and/or default occurs. The level of gearing compels senior 
lenders to reorganise rather than liquidate, because prompt 
transfer of control ensures going concern value exceeds 
liquidation value. 
Different internal and external valuations of a company 
result in agency costs of information asymmetry. Managers 
dissatisfied with a low stack price or cognisant of takeover-
vulnerability, may initiate a leveraged buyout, eg. Ross 
Johnson's RJR Nabisco bid (Saporito, 1989). Leveraged 
m. 
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buyouts unambiguously signal the bidding group·s confidence 
in the future performance of the firm, decreasing 
information asymmetry costs (Arzac, 1992), 
According to the aforementioned theory, State-owned 
enterprises should incur considerable agency costs. Managers 
do not have ownership interests or performance oriented 
remuneration, and external governance is weak due to the 
lack of traded equities and default free debt status 
(Wright, Thompson, Chiplin, & Robbie, 1991). Provided entry 
restrictions are not prohibitive agency theory would imply 
an active leveraged buyout market in Public sector 
enterprises, 
Therefore, agency theory rationalises value creation in 
leveraged buyouts by evaluating the impact of capital and 
ownership structures on future cash flow. Recognising that 
capital and ownership structures are interrelated allowed 
agency theorists to supplement Modigliani-Miller research. 
Fama's (1980) justification of the traditional public 
corporate structure has important implications for this 
research. His paper implies the benefits from leveraged 
buyouts, defined as agency cost savings less costs of 
concentrating diffuse ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
may be overstated. 
Fama (1980) rejected the popular notion that 
efficiently diversified claim holders are responsible for 
monitoring management. By dichotomising entrepreneurial 
activity into management and risk components, Fama (1980) 
I. 
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demonstrated that labour and takeover markets could 
effectively inhibit aberrant managerial behaviour. Punitive 
threats of dismissal, external control transfers and 
attendant downward revisions in future wage expectations 
mitigate agency costs. 
However, decisions taken by managers to entrench their 
positions, such as selecting compliant directors (Jensen, 
1989) and inserting takeover defense clauses, impede Fama's 
(1980) market mechanisms. Unlike labour and takeover 
markets, leveraged buyouts provide Effective internal 
monitoring where more immediate sanctions are applied as a 
result of poor performance. 
Transaction costs and managerialism are two furthe~ 
caveats to the efficiency of takeover ma~ket cont~ols. 
Takeovers do not p~oceed at the ma~gin since acqui~ers 
demand adequate compensation for risks and material 
transaction costs. Hence fi~m value may decline conside~ably 
befo~e acquisition inte~est develops. Although takeover 
ma~kets exert control over ta~get manage~s in the extreme, 
pa~adoxically they afford p~otection to acquirers through 
firm size increases. 
Fama (1980) and Jensen (1989) acknowledge that public 
stockmarkets reduce the risk of equity ownership, and hence, 
the cost of capital by facilitating diversification and 
liquidity. Since leveraged buyouts remove companies from 
stockmarkets the cost of (unlevered) equity capital may 
' 
• 
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increase. Therefore, the cost of concentrating diffuse 
ownership involves more than direct acquisition expense. 
The propensity for investing in buyout equity through 
specialist LBO funds attenuates problems associated with 
delisted stock. Brownstein (1989) and Newport Jr. (1989) 
assert pension funds commit between two and five percent of 
their portfolio to leveraged buyout funds, hence liquidity 
and diversification issues do not arise. 
The extent to which Fama's (1980) theory reduces 
potential benefits frot•l lever·aged buyouts is an empirical 
issue. This thesis closely examines the constitution of 
Australian leveraged buyouts for evidence that is consistent 
with, o~ ~epudiates the p~eceding theo~y as an explanation 
of value c~eation. The opposing ideologies of Fama (1980), 
Jensen and M~ckling (1976) suggest unique fi~m and indust~y 
cha~acte~istics affect the validity of leve~aged buyouts, a 
theme developed in the following section. 
Finally, agency theo~y is not p~edicated on the belief 
that p~actitione~s calculate agency cost savings when 
evaluating potential leve~aged buyouts. Applying a F~iedman 
and Savage (1948) a~gument, this thesis contends 
practitione~s need only behave as if they pe~fo~m the 
~elevant calculations. The distinction is impo~tant because 
elements of agency theory a~e neithe~ observable nor 
directly quantifiable. This research derives proxy tests 
(Chapter Three) which enable the impact of agency theory to 
be infer~ed. 
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~.2 Asset Structure 
The previous section acknowledged the inextricable link 
between capital and ownership structures. Leveraged buyouts 
reconstitute these structures, inducing operating 
efficiencies and superior incentives. This section considers 
how asset structure influences the magnitude and composition 
of firm capital, and the effect increased debt servicing 
commitments have on asset management. 
Leveraged buyouts do not universally apply to each 
company or industry sector in the economy. Abundant leverage 
places onerous demands on companies, such that buyout 
suitability is contingent on resilient repayment capacity. 
Repayment capability is deduced from anticipated net 
operating cash flows generated by the firm·s portfolio of 
assets, and the liquidity of unwanted assets divested from 
the buyout, 
Therefore, asset structur·e affects the level of gearing 
the firm can prudently support (Libecap, 1988). Asset 
structures that produce stable cash flow have low business 
risk capable of accomodating the financial r·isk inherent in 
leveraged buyouts .. Asset structures which are relatively 
immune from business or economic cycles, produce known brand 
names with strong market share (Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & 
Co., cited in Rappaport, 1990), and are not capital 
intensive (Rappaport, 1990), demonstrate low business risk. 
The asset structure also dictates the extent to which 
net operating cash flows can be enhanced by active asset 
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management. For example, firm's with copious working capital 
(Baker & Wruck, 1989; Smith, 1990) or underutilised fixed 
asset ca.r..,acity (Kuhn, 1990) offer managers opportunities to 
increase cash flow. In contrast, capital intensive asset 
structures do not support leveraged buyouts since marginal 
operating performance improvements require large capital 
injections. 
Substantial growth in the number and value of leveraged 
buyouts (Chapter One) reflects intense competition among 
financial institutions soliciting fee income and/or capital 
returns from buy aut in val vem.~nt. Ambitious acquisition 
multiples paid by winning bids provided the impetus for 
aggressive financing predicated on asset disposition(s). 
This activity culminated in the provision of bridge 
financing by commercial and investment banks. 
Increasing rate notes are frequently used to bridge 
asset divestitures. Their design penalises late repayment 
through interest rate ratchets approximating h~enty five 
basis points per quarter. Ar asset structure characterised 
by low specificity can support extensive debt levels 
(Williams, in Libecap, 1988), since readily separable assets 
may be redeployed to higher valued uses via liquid secondary 
markets, generating cash flow. 
There are two principal advantages from asset sales: 
(i) Business risk may be reduced by divesting assets with 
volatile or deferred cash flow distributions. A corollary of 
downsizing is the renewed focus of managerial and other 
m. 
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resources on those opera·tions which poss~~ss comparative 
advantage (Easterwood et al., 1989; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 
1990) • 
(ii) Proceeds from asset disposals may be used to discharge 
a portion of the firm's indebtedness, alleviating financial 
risk. 
While divesting unwanted liquid assets generates cash 
flow, sale and leaseback agreements written on assets still 
required by the company similarly enable non-operating 
resources (eg. land and buildings) to amortise debt. Asset 
characteristics 11etermine sale and leaseback suitability. 
Therefore, lenders evaluate the disposal value of 
assets collateralising loans and the stability of future 
cash flows when arranging debt capital for leveraged 
buyouts. The level of equity capital is limited to prevent 
dilution of investor returns. Hence, the asset structur~ 
influences the magnitude and composition of the capital 
structure. 
Prima facie, acquisition programs in leveraged buyouts 
indicate the pursuit of asset optimisation rather than 
merely break-up value (Muscarella et al., 1990; Baker & 
Wruck, 1989). Control exerted over capital expenditure due 
to the distribution of free cash flow provides greater 
assurance thnt negative net present value investments will 
be rejected (Jensen, 1986). Accordingly, increased debt 
servicing commitments are expected to motivate asset 
management practices which adhere to firm value criteria. 
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The emphasis on directing cash flaw toward debt 
amortisation could detrimentally affect maintenance, 
research and development expenditure essential to long-term 
investment. Palepu (1990) argues leveraged buyouts do not 
occur in R&D intensive industries, but acknowledges that 
cash-strapped buyouts may reject positive net present value 
investments. 
2,1.3 Orgqnisation Structure 
The revised capital, ownership and asset structures in 
leveraged buyouts induce concomitant or·ganisational reform. 
Leveraged buyouts implement organisaiianal changes which 
increase operating autonomy and align executive remuneration 
with cash flow. 
Operating autonomy is granted to managers since equity 
investors do not possess firm specific operating expertise 
or the requisite human resources (Jensen, 1989). Therefore, 
buyouts are characterised by centralised strategic decisions 
and decentralised operating decisions (Easterwood et al., 
1989). Williams (in Libecap, 1988) concurs, arguing 
leveraged buyouts exhibit high managerial specificity since 
the specialist's marginal productivity is maximised when its 
capital and other resources are applied to restructuring, 
rather than operating activities (Muscarella et al., 1990). 
Hence, the strength and cohesiveness of the management 
team is an important factor in leveraged buyouts (Burke & 
Fite, 1990). Specialists contribute to the strategic 
direction of the firm and advise managers on the transition 
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from profit to cash flow· maximisation. Executive incentiv8 
remuneration suppleme~ts corporate governance by motivating 
cash flow generation, alleviating negative effects from 
managerial equity ownership, and reducing buyout risk. 
Specialists introduce executive remuneration schemes 
which incorporate bonus plans with cash flow performance 
targets. The material rewards offered for achieving cash 
goals compensate managers for unique risk bearing associated 
with undiversified portfolios (Baker & Wruck, 1989), 
Therefore, incentive schemes mitigate managerial bias toward 
conservatism that undiversified portfolios may provoke. 
In addition, the incentive scheme is a va~iable cost 
that is positively correlated with the fi~m·s cash flow 
dist~ibution. Accordingly, inc~easing the bonus component 
makes cash outflows more variable, dec~easing the asset 
beta. 
Scheduled debt ~epayments and bonus performance 
incentives provide the impetus fo~ seve~e cost cutting,. 
pa~ticula~ly from co~po~ate ove~heads. The decent~alisation 
of operating decisions ~equi~es less bureaucratic suppo~t, 
and buyout executives may ~espond by eliminating 
inte~mediate hierarchical levels (Easterwood et al., 1989; 
Jensen, 1989), Co~porate administrative ~esources may also 
be pared if assets a~e divested. 
Baker and Wruck (1989) suggest the shorter lines of 
authority engender flexible responses to market vagaries 
since communication and decision making become more 
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efficient. Similarly, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) 
conclude that "the buyout process create[s] a new 
4! 
organisational structure which appears . more efficient 
than its public predecessor'' (p. 1412). Rappaport (1990) is 
critical of management's ability to capitalise on this 
efficiency due to alleged financial inflexibility caused by 
extensive debt. 
Therefore, although leveraged buyouts may achieve 
marginal cost of capital savings, they do not appear 
sufficient to explain the magnitude of buyout gains. A more 
plausible explanation for value creation is provided by 
agency theory, whereby internal conflicts of interest are 
mitigated principally through the mechanism of debt 
utilisation. The theoretical review demonstrates that 
leveraged buyouts fundamentally reconstitute the 
interrelated capital, ownership, asset, and organisation 
structures. 
the theoretical review outlines the advantages of 
having a comprehensive understanding of the theory 
underpinning leveraged buyouts. Managers, specialists and 
financial institutions may avoid the pitfalls of ill-
conceived buyouts by correctly identifying LBO candidates 
and restructuring activities likely to yield high returns. 
They also provide some explanation as to why leveraged 
buyouts might be preferred over other reorganisation 
techniques. 
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Palepu (1990) for e-xample, compares lever-aged buyouts 
with leveraged recapitalisations. The implication ·that 
partial corporate restructuring may achieve simi !ar· returns 
to buyouts is not supported by the theory. Th ~ thesis 
contends that leveraged buyout performance is attributable 
to complete structur-al emphasis on cash flow generation. In 
C':lntrast, leveraged r-ecaps lack corporate governance by 
major- investors, such that managers have incentive to 
approve risky projects, increasing the cost of debt capital. 
Rappaport (1990, p. 100) believes public corporations 
may achieve similar benefits to leveraged buyouts through 
"shareholder value". However, buyouts not only facilitate 
change but more importantly, offer managers incentive to do 
so. Managers are unlikely to subject themselves to difficult 
trading conditions and stringent corporate governance unless 
they control operating decisions and participate in the 
firm's success. 
The theoretical review facilitates development of the 
theoretical fr-amework and forms the basis for generalisation 
of empirical results (Yin, 1984), The degree of congruence 
with foreign buyout models may then be inferred. The 
following section examines empirical work conducted overseas 
for evidence that supports or- refutes existing theory. 
2 • 2 Eyjdenc:e 
This section reviews empirical evidence on leveraged 
buyouts conducted in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. These studies have been classified into three 
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categories which examine diff~rent aspects of the buyout 
phenomenon. 
Researchers have analysed public corporations that were 
subsequently targeted for leveraged buyouts. Generally, 
attr-ibutes indicative of LBO candidature were consistent 
with theoretical expectations. 
The controversy regarding wealth creation or 
redistribution in leveraged buyouts has attracted 
considerable research effort. A comprehensive review of 
these papers reveals statistical support for the economic 
wealth creation hypothesis. 
Finally, case studies investigate particular buyouts to 
determine whether the phenomena identified in large sample 
studies are representative of individual transactions. 
2.2.1 Industry and Company Characteristics 
Bull (1989) 1 Easterwood et al. (1989), Waite and 
Fridso~ (1989) categorise leveraged buyouts by industry, 
spanning 1971-1988. The latter study was more comprehensive 
since it involved numerous buyouts over a long period, and 
industry LBO transaction value was normalised by industry 
share of Gross Domestic Product. T3ble 2.1 discloses the 
most intensive leveraged buyout industries. 
The LBO intensive industries closely comply with 
preconceived notions of buyout suitability. All involve the 
manufacture and/or sale of relatively mundane products 
resilient to economic cycles. In additionJ these industries 
a. 
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reflect mature sectors of the economy with low growth 
prospects. 
Table 2.1 
Leyera~ed Buyout Intensity Ratios 
Industry 
Stone, clay, and glass 
Apparel 
Textiles 
Food 
Paper 
Electrical machinery 
Source: Waite and Fridson, 1989, p. 46. 
LBO Intensity 
13.9 
8.1 
7.9 
5.1 
4.5 
3.0 
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Waite and Fridson (1989) derive a cash flow volatility 
regression estimate which measures the standard deviation of 
industry annual cash flow relative to cash flow implicit in 
the S&P 400 Industrial Index. Fourteen of the fifteen LBO 
intensive industries demonstrate low cash flow volatility. 
In contrast, five of six non-LED intensive industries had 
high cash flow volatility. Waite and Fridson (1989, p. 46) 
conclude that there is "a concentration of leveraged buyouts 
in . . . industries best equipped to support them". 
Maupin, Bidwell and Drtegren (1984) apply discriminant 
analysis across a paired sample of sixty three buyouts and 
public companies in !972-1983. Buyout targets had higher 
mean cash flow than firms remaining public for both years 
preceding the event, and in most cases, lower cash flow 
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variation. Over a similar ~eriod, Bull (1989) finds mean 
cash flow adjusted for sales to be 1457. of industry average. 
Regression models run by Singh (1990) lend credence to the 
significance (at 51.) of cash flow as a determinant of 
leveraged buyouts. 
Three further variables which influence leveraged 
buyout predictability are dividend yield, income taxation, 
and working capital, 
Maupin et al. (1984) report mean dividend yields for 
buyout targets significantly exceed those of non-target 
companies. Higher debt servicing commitments may be 
maintained where cash previously allocated to dividends is 
redirected to debt amortisation. Prima facie, this appears 
to contradict Jensen's (1986} free cash flow hypothesis. 
However, Jensen's theory is concerned with retention of cash 
flow beyond that required to fund positive net present value 
projects. Given high cash flow and slow growth it is 
plausible that excessive retentions occur even with higher 
average dividend yields. 
Mean effective tax rates for buyout targets were 1121. 
of industry average (Bull, 1989). Kaplan (1989a), Lehn and 
Poulsen (1988) disclose significant correlation between 
buyout premiums and estimated tax benefits. Substantial 
taxation deductions utilised by leveraged buyouts defer tax 
liabilities and cash outflows, increasing fixed charge 
coverage. Lowenstein (1985) asserts tax-free status could 
prevail for five years. 
0. 
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The level of gearing does not appear to differ~~tiate 
buyout targets from test samples. Average tarqet firms have 
more conservative capital structures (Maupin et al., 1984), 
however regressions performed by Singh (1990) and Maupin et 
al. (1984) deem the relationship insignificant. 
These results are consistent with the DeAngelo-Masulis 
(Copeland et al., 1988) thesis on optimal debt levels. 
Leveraged buyouts seem indifferent to a target's capital 
structure unless high effective tax rates promote cost of 
capital reductions. 
Indifference to the target's capital structure may be 
partially explained by control group selection. Maupin et 
al. (1984) and Singh (1990) use industry rivals to control 
experimental noise within industries. However, research 
designs of this genre will not account for debt ratio 
differences between industries. In the USA for example, in 
1986, electrical machinery (LBO intensive) and petroleum 
(non-LBD intensive) industries had average debt ratios of 
29% and 49% respectively (Erealey & Myers, 1988). 
Empirical research indicates buyout targets have 
working capital 'slack', the elimination of which creates 
low-cost finance. Smith (1990) found high industry adjusted 
accounts receivable and inventory holding periods; and 
Maupin et al. (1984) note relatively high mean cash 
intervals (though not statistically significant). 
Receivables turnover was found to be a determinant of 
leveraged buyouts at a 10% confidence level (Singh, 1990). 
"· 
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Price to book value discounts and unsolicited takeover 
offers also appear common to buyout candidates. Maupin et 
al. (1984) note buyout targets have significantly lower 
price to book value ratios. On average, buyout targets trade 
at a discount to book value (DeAngelo et al., 1987). Hence 
buyouts mitigate agency costs associated with asymmetric 
information by disclosing 'true· market values. 
Prior takeover attempts discriminate between buyouts 
and non-buyouts at a li'. confidence level (Singh, 1990), 
Stringent third party corporate governance ensures leveraged 
buyouts are not principally used to secure management jobs. 
Competitive bidding reinforces the resolution of asymmetric 
information, preventing minority fr-eezeouts. 
Therefore, industry and company characteristics which 
invite leveraged buyouts are consistent with preceding 
theory. Prime candidates reside in industrial sectors 
relatively immune from economic cycles and produce large 
amounts of stable cash flow. High dividend yields and high 
effective tax rates provide additional sources of cash flow, 
with the latter facilitating cost of capital reductions. 
Excessive working capital may indicate a potential source of 
cost effective, short term finance. Book value discounts and 
•Jr-ior takeover attempts collectively reduce asymmetric 
information costs. 
Kieschnick Jr. (in Amihud, 1989) counsels caution when 
interpreting Maupin et al. (1984) results, since joint 
distributions of independent variables do not form 
•• 
Literature Review 48 
multivariate normal distributions required by discriminant 
analysis. Kieschnick Jr. uses a logit framework (as per 
Singh, 1990) to overcome these errors and finds no support 
for- Maupin et al. (1984) results. Hence, if Kieschnick Jr's 
criticism is valid, then the dividend yield result may be 
anomalous. All other Maupin et al. (1994) results reported 
in this section were substantiated by ather research. 
2.2.2 Corporate Restructuring 
The previous section confirmed theoretical propositions 
regarding industry and company characteristics peculiar to 
leveraged buyout targets. This section considers changes to 
corporate structure and performance as a result of the 
buyout. The conclusions drawn from the empirical review 
support wealth creation consistent t-.i th the agency cost 
framework. 
Ownership Structure. 
The concentration of equity ownership is evident in 
several research papers. Kaplan (1989b) found median 
management team equity holdings increased from 6/. to 23/. in 
large ()$50M) public company buyouts. Directors and managers 
held 19/. of pre-buyout equity, and in conjunction with LBO 
specialists, 991. of post-buyout equity. 
Smith (1990) studied a similar period to Kaplan and 
presented further refinements of equity ownership. Median 
outside director equity holdings remained constant, while 
officers and major investors increased from 11/. to 171. and 
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9% to 49%, respectively. Aggregating the above categories 
represents an increase in equity ownership from 35/. to 95%. 
Unlike the above research, Muscarella and Vetsuypens' 
(1990) sample included divisional leveraged buyouts. The top 
three divisional executives held no equity in the parent 
company pr-ior- to buyout in 80% of cases, averaging 0.25'l. 
equity in the remainder. O-fficers and directors held 63/. of 
the equity fallowing the (divisional and full) buyout, with 
top three executives accounting far 26%. 
DeAngelo et al. (1987); Wright, Thompson, Chiplin, and 
Robbie (199lbl confirm that smaller scaled leveraged buyouts 
have higher average management equity ownership prior to, 
and after the buyout, 
Therefore, there is strong support for the hypothesis 
that leveraged buyouts align managerial incentives with long 
term firm maximisation, and improve corporate governance, 
through intensive management and third party equity 
ownership, 
Capital Structure. 
Table 2.2 records the transformation in the capital 
structure framing the event date, The debt ratio essentially 
doubles in US buyouts with negligible change in the UK. The 
UK result is unexpected, especially since the debt ratio for 
all UK companies in 1983 was 29i. (Berglof, 1991), Other 
studies on British buyouts do not disclose pre-buyout debt 
ratios, hence Kitching's results cannot be verified. 
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Table 2.2 
Mean Debt Ratios FraminQ LBO (%1 
Study Period Pee Post 
Muscar-ella et a!. (1990) 1976-1986 41.4 90.6 
Smith (1990) 1977-1986 59.0 101.0 
Kitching ( 1989) 1980-1987 US: 45.2 '97.6 
UK: 73.2 79.6 
Debt ratios are defined as the sum of long term debt and 
current liabilities divided by total assets; except Smith, 
whose denominator is total tangible assets. 
Table 2.2 indicates that US buyouts utilise debt to a 
greater extent than those in the UK. Not shown, is the US 
preference for funding buyouts predominantly w~th long term 
debt (Lehn & Poulsen, 1988; Kitching, 1989), as compared 
with more balanced UK capital struc~ures. 
The extent of the gearing in leveraged buyouts ensures 
a significant proportion of free cash flow is distributed in 
accordance with Jensen's (1986) hypothesis. 
Although large sample studies have not considered strip 
financing, case studies document the prevalence of multiple 
financing layers and convertible securities which usually 
accompany this technique (eg. CBS Magazine division, O.M. 
Scott, RJR Nabisco). 
Asset Structure. 
Kaplan (1991) found 29% of LBO companies and 34/. of LBO 
assets were acquired by other strategic buyers at least 3.67 
• 
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yea~s afte~ the buyout .. Dve~ half of Smith's (1990) sample 
of 58 buyouts disposed of at least 201. of thei~ property, 
plant, and equipment. 
Muscarella et al. (1990) compute a significant 
difference (at 1~) between divisional and full leveraged 
buyout asset sales. Asset sales occurred in 29'l. of their 
sample, however the distribution was skewed, with 20% of 
division8l and 551. of full leveraged buyouts divesting 
assets. 
Kitching (1989) uncovered a substantial role for sale 
and leaseback transactions, with over 70/. of leveraged 
buyouts employing this technique to raise funds. Muscarella 
et al. (1990) find 25/. of leveraged buyouts acquired assets. 
The divestiture and acquisition programmes observed in 
leveraged buyouts support the contention that managers seek 
comparative advantage and increased firm value from asset 
optimisation. 
Organisation Structure. 
Baker and Wruck (1989) provide direct evidence on the 
decentralisation of operating decisions within a strategic 
framework controlled by a majority equity partner. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 establish the abundance of 
divestment and privatisation buyouts in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. This thesis suggests divestment and 
privatisation buyout targets operate within more elaborate 
hierarchies by virtue of their accountability to a holding 
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company or Government owner. Independence promotes 
decentralised organisational structures. 
Figure 2.1 
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Muscarella et al. (1990) report 96% of leveraged 
buyouts implemented managerial incentive compensation plans. 
Stock options, stock appreciation rights, and other stock 
incentive schemes featured in 72/. of buyouts. Compensation 
plans typically increase the level and variation of bonus 
payments (Baker & Wruck, 1989). Therefore, material bonuses 
contingent on attaining cash flow performance targets 
motivate firm value maximising behaviour. 
Muscarella et al. (1990) also note 221. of buyouts 
initiate cost reduction programmes, though they do not 
segregate these changes into their components. 
Therefore, leveraged buyout organisation structures are 
leaner due to increased reliance on internal discipline and 
entrepreneurialism, and reduced managerial and support staff 
requirements caused by aSset divestitures. 
According to theorists, restructuring activities 
outlined in the empirical review should generate internal 
efficiencies and performance improvements. Leveraged buyout 
proponents assert structural metamorphosis promotes value 
maximising behaviour, whereas detractors allege wealth is 
t~ansfer~ed among stakeholde~s. The next section synthesises 
empi~ical research on the economic wealth o~ redistribution 
conund~um. 
2.2.3 Ecgnomic Wealth Versus Bedjstrjbutigo 
Discussions on the economic consequences of leveraged 
buyouts commence with the stock premium as a refe~ence for 
fina11cial gains. Stock premiums and performance imp~ovements 
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must withstand expropriation claims from bondholders, 
taxpayers, employees, and stockholders; and should not be 
derived from expedient investment decisions which sacrifice 
long term prosperity. 
Stock Premiums. 
Public stockholders receive substantial premiums when 
leveraged buyout offers are consummated. Table 2.3 
delineates average LBO stock ~remiums in the United States. 
UK bid premiums have not been published, though Wright et 
al. (1991b, p. 139) note ''premia for going-private buyouts 
are in line with , • hostile takeover bids'', 
Table 2.3 
Average Stock Premiums in LBOs 
Cf Days No. 
Study Premium% < Offer Firms 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Rice ( 1984) 56.3 40 72 
Lowenstein (1985) 56.0 30 28 
Lehn & Poulsen (1988) 40.0 20 89 
Easterwood, Hsieh & Singer ( 1988) 48.6 40 110 
Kaplan (1989b) 45.9 60 76 
Amihud (1989) First offer: 31.1 20 15 
Final offer: 42.9 20 15 
Source: Amihud, 1989, p. 9. 
Lowenstein (1985) disputes the assertion that LBO stock 
premiums represent the minimum amount by which bidders 
expect to increase firm value (Lehn & Poulsen, 1988; Jensen, 
II 
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1989). He sur-mises that .stock prices ar-e determined by short 
horizon institutional investors such that (long horizon) bid 
premiums overstate gains available to public stockholders. 
Hence, stock premiums would be inappropriate for gauging 
wealth creation in leveraged buyouts under this hypothesis. 
Capital market efficiency literature does not support 
the market segmentation implied by Lowenstein (1985). 
Abnormal returns would be eliminated by the competitive 
actions of risk arbitrageurs. Applying a conservative bid 
premium of 401., this thesis calculates the US going-private 
buyout market yielded over $608 in stock premiums for 1979-
1988 inclusive. Therefore, buyout bid premiums produce 
significant wealth gains for original public stockholders. 
Performance Improvements. 
Numerous studies analyse leveraged buyout performance 
using ratios calculated from accounting data. Generally, 
leveraged buyouts have performed better than industry 
competitors and the market portfolio, subject to data 
limitations common to most buyout research. 
Kitching (1989) and Singh (1990) found sales revenue 
and growth increased for the three years following the 
buyout. Controlling for industry effects, Singh (1990) 
attributed most of the improvements to divisional buyoUts. 
Muscarella et al. (1990) note the median real rate of change 
in sales increased by 9.41. prior to public offering, but 
conclude the results were not exceptional. In contrast to 
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Singh (1990) 1 most sales revenue increases were ascribed to 
full leveraged buyouts. 
Bull (1989) found significant increases in mean 
industry adjusted sales to assets ratios. In contrast, 
Muscarella et al. (1990) report a decline in medjan asset 
turnovers compared with randomly selected control f~rms, 
particularly for full leveraged buyouts. Sales to employee 
ratios improved marginally, implying asset turnovers may be 
negatively affected by asset step-ups used in buyouts. 
Therefore, empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
leveraged buyouts on sales revenue is inconclusive. Although 
sales increase, adjustments for industry and asset changes 
produce conflicting results. 
Singh (1990) notes a significant decrease in industry 
adjusted accounts receivable and inventory holding periods. 
A survey of 182 UK buyouts reports 43'l. of respondents cite 
reduced debtor days following the buyout (Wright et al., 
1991), Smith (1990) corroborates these findings, noting the 
industry adjusted cash operating cycle declines 18% within 
one year of the buyout, with negligible change in the 
payments period. Therefore, leveraged buyouts generate 
operating performance improvements through active working 
capital 1nan~gement. 
Bull ( 1c]gt;' reports significant increases in median 
industry adjusted cash f 1 ow to sales ratios. Kaplan ( 1989b) 
notes cash flow increases when prorated by sales (45/., 721., 
28%) and assets (501., 85/., 64%), for the first three post-
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buyout years relative to the final pre-buyout year. Smith 
(1990) reinforces the cash flow returns, using a superior 
free cash flow proxy and eliminating non-operating assets 
from her analysis. Her observations suggest accounting 
accruals do not confound performance results. 
Cash flow performance measures increase after- leveraged 
buyouts, exceeding industry averages even after partially 
controlling for divestitures. Hence, there is strong 
evidence of performance improvements following leveraged 
buyouts. 
On average, earnings before interest and tax (EBITJ, 
operating returns and profit margins increase following 
leveraged buyouts. 
EBIT increased over 50% for the five years post-buyout, 
relative to the buyout year (Kitching, 1989). Muscarella et 
al. (1990) find median EBIT improvements (40%) exceed 82% of 
randomly select8d control firms. Industry adjusted operating 
income (EBIT + Depreciation + Amortisation) deflated by 
sales or assets, also increase after buyouts (Kaplan, 
1989b). 
Median leveraged buyout gross profit and operating 
margins significantly exceed their industry rivals 
(Muscarella et al., 1990). Deflating by sales, median gross 
profit and operating margins increase by 14% and 23% 
respectively, with divisional buyouts accounting for most 
gains. These results outperformed all industry control 
firms, Similar findings are presented for margins deflated 
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by assets, with Bull (1989) confirming the significance of 
these increases. Given inconclusive sales revenue results, 
margin spreads indicate better production cost control. 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) established that 
leveraged buyout plants have material increases in total 
factor productivity for the three years after the buyout. It 
is interesting that LBOs were associated with more 
productive plant than average in the three years preceding 
buyout. 
Lichtenber-g and Siegel (1990) note post-buyout 
productivity is not significant beyond the third year, which 
is explained by data aggregation across calender years. The 
researchers conclude 1983-86 buyouts exhibit productivity 
improvements, whereas 1981-82 buyouts do not. The results 
are also consistent with the hypothesis that buyouts extract 
short-term gains which are not sustained. 
Muscarella et al. ( 1990) examine returns to leveraged 
buyout equity between the LBO and IPO dates. The median 
annualised rate of return on equity was 268'l., with 
divisional buyouts outperforming full buyouts. When compared 
with a similarly geared investment in the S&P500 index, they 
were unable to conclude that leveraged buyouts earn excess 
returns. The large return adequately compensated unusually 
high financial risk and illiquidity present in the 
investment. 
Kaplan (1989b) used similar mei:hodology to investigate 
the total return to capital (debt and equity), finding 
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investors earned a combined median market adjusted r·eturn of 
771.. This gair. was equally apportioned between pre-buyout 
and past-buyout investors. Wright et al. (1991) cite studies 
of UK buyouts which indicate superior market adjusted 
performance prior to, and after flotation. 
Therefore, large, fair returns realised by leveraged 
buyout investors are consistent with enhanced economic 
performance. These returns incorporate aforementioned 
positive operating results, quantifying buyout effects and 
contrasting them with passive investment benchmarks. This 
evidence supports value creation in leveraged buyouts, 
however, research limitations qualify generalisation of 
results. 
The heterogeneity of leveraged buyouts demands 
relatively large sample sizes to enable population 
parameters to be inferred. However, the private nature of 
the phenomenon impedes data collection, such that sampling 
units are selected from buyouts with public debt 
outstanding, or in the process of issuing public securities. 
Hence, non-~epresentative sampling frames compound sample 
size concerns, although the direction of any bias is 
uncertain. 
Lowenstein (1985) and Bull's (1989) generalisations are 
based on samples numbering 28 and 25 buyouts respectively. 
Muscarella et al, (1990) and Singh (1990) draw inferences on 
full leveraged buyouts from subsets containing 18 and 22 
transactions. ln addition, performance results of Kaplan 
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(1989b) have samples as low as 13 by the third post-buyout 
year. Therefore, there are external validity concerns 
associated with some leveraged buyout research. 
l"he performance studies of Kaplan (1989b), Smith 
(1990), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) are conducted over a 
period of economic growth. For example, Smith's (1990) 
research spans 1977-1986, however, )80/. of her sample is 
within 1982-1986. Accordingly~ these studies do not placate 
concerns regarding buyout performance during economic 
downturns. 
The relatively recent development of leveraged buyouts 
limits the longitudinal data available to researchers. 
Kaplan (1989b), Smith (1990) and Muscarella et al. (1990) 
have post-buyout periods predominantly between two and three 
years in length. Whether LEOs sustain short-term performance 
improvements is an issue for further research, particularly 
given Lichtenberg and Siegel's (1990) poor t+4 and t+5 
productivity results. 
Wealth Transfers from Bqndhplders. 
The most emotive expropriation claims emanate from 
corporate investment grade bondholders. Empirical evidence 
confirms significant bondholder wealth losses result from 
buyout event risk, however, these losses do not offset 
stockholder gains. Corporate finance theory and legal 
concepts rebut bondholder remonstrations. 
Lehn and Poulsen (1988) investigate bond price changes 
over a twenty day window centred on the LBO announcement 
c. 
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date. The average price change for non-convertible and 
convertible bonds were -2.46/. and 0.49% respectively. They 
conclude the general bond market decline of 7.21/. for the 
same period proves net bond price movements due to leveraged 
buyouts ar-e insignificant. 
Similarly, Marais, Schipper and Smith ( 1989) calculate 
a two day announcement abnormal return of -0.03"1., and a 
post-announcement til completion return of -1.0% tor 30 
corporate bonds. Neither result was significant. 
In contrast, for a ten day window centred on the LBO 
announcement date, Travlos and Millon (cited in Amihud, 
1989) find significant cumulative non-convertible bond 
returns of -3.51%. Warga and Welch (cited in Crabbe, 1991) 
estimate risk adjusted prices for 43 non-convertible bonds 
decline 7.71. on average, for the period two months before to 
one month after the LBO announcement. 
Amihud ( 1989) notes downgradings of corporate 
investment grade debt in 9 large leveraged buyouts; with 
Crabbe (1991) estimating bondholder losses from downgradings 
ranging 7.771.-11.831. for bonds involved in leveraged 
buyouts, takeover defense res true tur ings, mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Asquith and Wizman (1990) resolve the cor1flicting 
empirical work on bondholder wealth effects by increasing 
the sample size and differentiating bonds according to their 
covenant protection. They found significant negative 
abnormal bond returns for two and four month anno~ncement 
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windows, and for the entire buyout period. The whole sample 
abnormal returns of -1.1%, -2.2/. and -2.0% exceed other 
studies, furthermore, the contrast between strong, weak and 
no protection bond covenants (+2.67., -0.71., -5.2/.) lS 
striking. 
The evidence also suggests practitioners are cognisant 
of the importu.nce of bond covenants when structuring 
leveraged buyouts. Bonds with strong covenant protection 
were called, tendered for, defeased or renegotiated during 
the buyout, whereas those with no protection remained 
outstanding. 
The magnitude of pre-buyout bondholder wealth losses 
should be considered in context of the total wealth gains 
available in leveraged buyouts. Bondholders in Asquith and 
Wizman·s (1990} study incurred abnormal losses of $67BM, a 
small fraction of the $21.58 in stockholder gains. This 
t.:onfirms Jensen's (1989) anecdotal RJR Nabisco estimates of 
$300M and $128. Therefore, bondholder wealth expropriation 
accounts for approximately 37. of the entire value increase 
in leverage buyouts. 
Pre-buyout bondholders argue wealth expropriation is 
unfair, occasionally seeking restitution through litigation. 
Corporate finance theory and legal concepts disparage the 
alleged injustice to leveraged buyout bondholders. 
To the extent that high grade corporate bonds contain 
covenants restricting mergers and acquisitions, bondholders 
may have expropriated wealth from stockholders during 
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conglomeration. For example, merging firms with less than 
perfectly cor-related cash flow streams accord bondholders 
more prote~tion from default. In addition, stockholders of 
'both' firms in the merged entity provide funds in the event 
of default. 
Delaware (USA) law precedents also address particular 
concerns of bondholders. Bonds are composed solely of ''the 
periodic and regular payment of interest and the eventual 
repayment of principal'' (Mannino, 1990, p. 41). Hence bond 
prices per se are not important to the courts. The 
prevalence of super poison put covenants and event risk data 
suggest bondholders implicitly accept limited indenture 
protection for higher returns, 
Wealth Tran~fe~s from Taxpayers. 
The tax efficiency of leveraged buyouts has been cited 
by researchers concerned with the social implications of the 
phenomenon. They contend that legislative bias subsidises 
leveraged buyouts, effectively causing other taxpayers to 
bear a disproportionate share of the taxation burden. 
The suggestion that leveraged buyout utility is derived 
from taxation arbitrage is not supported by the literature. 
The empirical review demonstrates that tax affects price and 
deal structure, not the existance of buyouts. These results 
are reinforced by the resilience of buyouts to changes in 
tax legislation designed to reduce bias. This section 
concludes with anecdotal and empirical evidence which 
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implies taxation consequences of leveraged buyouts need not 
be negative, as fir-st presumed. 
Leveraged buyouts capitalise on the deductibility of 
interest payments. Directing cash flow to the amortisation 
of debt interest shields income otherwise subject to tax. 
Cramdown (payment-in-kind debt or PIK preferred stock, deep 
disc~unt zero coupon bonds) maximises taxation benefits by 
generating current deductions and deferring cash (interest) 
outflows (Amihud, ·1989). Kaplan (1989a) found the median 
value of inte1··est deductions r-epr-esented 14/.-130% of the 
buyout premium paid to stockholders. 
The Economic Rec1:wery Tax Act (ERTA) 1981 and the Tax 
Reform Act (TRA) 1984 also allowed deductions for debt 
principal financing purchases through employee stock 
ownership plans (DeAngelo et al., 1987). The buyout group 
acquires the company, obtaining "an ordinary deduction 
for the purchase price of shares in the company itself" 
(Lowenstein, 1985, p. 761). For example, Lowenstein (1985) 
ascribes 67'l. of the Dan River Inc. purchase price to ESOP 
tax savings. 
Another source of tax shields for leveraged buyouts was 
the step-up in tax basis of depreciable assets to market 
value. The median value of incr·eased depreciation deductions 
accounted for 301. of buyout premiums, however, fewer than 
50'l. of leveraged buyouts since 1982 elected to step-up their 
assets (Kaplan, 1989a). Pre-buyout depreciation of $500 1 000 
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pa for Gibson Greeting Cards Inc. became $2.3M pa for the 
buyout group (Lowenstein, J.985). 
Kaplan (1989a) notes the median tax to operating income 
ratio declines from 207. to 1/. for the two years before, and 
two years after the buyout, respectively. This ratio 
increases to 15/. one year prior to public offering, with 
only 16/. of random selections having lower effective tax 
rates (Muscarella et al,, 1990). 
Researchers performed regressions to ascertain whether 
a discernable relationship exists between taxation and 
buyout premiums. They regressed tax deductions (Kaplan, 
1989a) and tax liabilities (Lehn et al., 1988) against 
market adjusted premiums, finding a positive relationship in 
each case. Kaplan's (1989a) study is more rigorous since it 
applies a direct proxy for buyout (cf pre-buyout) tax 
effects. 
Therefore, taxation benefits are an important source of 
value in leveraged buyouts. The above evidence is consistent 
with the hypothesis that tax gains do not constitute the 
entire return expected from leveraged buyouts. Changes to US 
tax legislation eliminating certain provisions expluitEd by 
LBOs has not sus~ended market activity. Just as buyouts 
occurred before ERTA 1981, they have also prevailed since: 
(i) TRA 1986 lowered the corporate tax rate from 46/. to 34/. 
and effectively removed the asset step-up election (Kaplan, 
1989a; Newbould, Chatfield, & Anderson, 1992). 
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(ii) 1989 provisions disallow refunds for the portion of tax 
losses attributable to interest expense (Attacks on M&A 
innovations, 1991), 
(iii) 1990 provisions discourage cramdown, requiring 
preferred PIK stockholders to treat redemption premiums 
(redemption price less issue price) as taxable dividends 
(Amihud, 1989). 
A microeconomic evaluation of leveraged buyouts 
recognises the tax efficiency of these transactions, 
however, it does not follow that LBOs have a negative tax 
impact in the macroeconomy. Jensen, Kaplan, and Stiglin 
(cited ~n Palepu, 1990) estimate LEOs increase the present 
value of net tax revenues by 61%, under 1989 law. Cahi.ll and 
Castorina (1990) analyse the tax effect of the RJR Nabisco 
buyout, estimating that for every $1 'lost' as a result of 
the acquisition, the US Treasury recoups $2.72 from direct 
and indirect sources outlined in Table 2.4. 
Quantitative tax analysis may allay fears regarding the 
financial impact of leveraged buyouts on the economy, 
however, public policy must also consider the distribution 
of tax liabilities in the community. This qualitative effect 
has not been addressed by authors in this subject area. 
Wealth Transfers from Employees. 
Wealth may be expropriated from employees through 
pervasive cutbacks in labour or wages, and/or premature 
terminations of overfunded pension plans. The empirical 
review does not support the notion of widespread employee 
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layoffs associated with -leveraged buyouts, rather an 
unwillingness to hire new labour at comparable industry 
rates. The extent to which lower employment levels are 
attributable to wealth transfers or productivity 
improvements lS debatable. While evidence pertaining to 
pension terminations is mixed, the data suggests overfLtnded 
assets may explain a large portion of LED bid premia. 
Table 2.4 
Projected RJR Nabisco Tax Effects ($Ml 
Tax Effect 
Source Gain Loss 
Gain to stockholders from sale of stock 3,000 
Interest deduction on acquisition debt 3,200 
Increase in dividend stream (Reinvest.) 590 
Subtotal 3,590 3,200 
Tax payments by financial lnstitutions 
on acquisition debt 298 
Stockholder reinvestment of proc~eds 1,200 
Post-acquisition asset sales 3,600 
Total 8,688 3,200 
Net gain 5, 488 
Source: Cahill and Castorina, 1990, p. 52. 
Kaplan (1989b) and Smith (1990) note the change in 
employment levels from one year before, to one year after 
the buyout. The median change in employment is 0.9/. 1 or 4.9/. 
when controlling for divestments (Kaplan, 1989b), The number 
D. 
Literature Review 68 
of employees increased in 50X of buyouts, and 62% for the 
non-divestment subset. Muscarella et al. (1990) find the 
median number of employees fell 0.6'l. between the buyout and 
public offering. Controlling for divestiture however, they 
report employment growth of 17/.. 
Increased employment levels contrasts with anecdotal 
evidence. For example, Safeway dismissed 67,000 employees 
(38'l.) as part of its buyout (Magowan, 1989). The increased 
employment results however, are based on samples containing 
26 (Kaplan, 1989b) and 12 (Muscarella et al., 1990) btJyouts. 
Small sample sizes limit the inferences which may be drawn 
with respect to the population of leveraged buyouts. 
Kaplan (1989b) and Smith (1990) repo~t a decline in 
industry adjusted employment. Kaplan (1989b) notes a 
significant fall of 12%, which is consistent with Muscarella 
et al. (1990) finding 92% of random selections with median 
employment growth higher than leveraged buyouts. Lichtenberg 
and Siegel (1990) examined employment components, concluding 
the ratio of non-production to production employment (wages) 
declined 6.5/. (15.3/.) from t-1 to t+2. Hourly and annual 
rates of compensation for p~oduction workers increased 2.31. 
and 3.6% respectively. 
The evidence does not indicate that buyout gains result 
from widespread employment cutbacks, rather, the demand for 
new labour is below industry average. The reduction in white 
collar to blue collar workers implies a leaner organisation 
structure. 
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Ippolito and James (1992) examine buyouts over the 
period 1980-1987, noting a significant increase in pension 
fund termination rates following LBO announcements. The 
pension plans in their database have funding ratios 
averaging 1801. of termination benefits, hence there is 
considerable scope for wealth losses to employees. In fact, 
excess assets acquired in terminations of defined benefit 
plans explain 50% of LBO premiums. Two competing hypotheses 
of premature termination are: (il firm restructuring 
designed to improve competitiveness, and (ii) opportL1nistic 
breaking of implicit contracts. Although test results are 
mixed, the evidence suggests opportunistic transfe~s f~om 
employee pension entitlements may occu~ in leve~aged 
buyouts. 
Musca~ella et al. (1990) do not elabo~ate on the 
finding that 5.61. of thei~ sample buyouts te~minate 
ove~funded pension plans. The low pe~centage could indicate 
maintenance of employee emoluments, or a low pe~centage of 
pension plans (mo~e pa~ticula~ly defined benefit plans) in 
the sample. 
Wealth Transfers from Pre Buyout Stockholders. 
Manage~s have access to p~ivileged info~mation not 
available to potential acqui~e~s o~ stockholde~s in the 
company. Thei~ unique inside knowledge of futu~e expected 
returns and their ability to influence internal accounting 
policies implies managers could underprice buyout offers and 
·steal· companies from stockholde~s, despite bid premiums 
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based on public information. Most of the evidence pertaining 
to information asymmetry suggests underpricing does not 
occu~. A competitive corporate control market and litigation 
risk disciplines management. 
Lowenstein (1985) examined a sample of 28 buyouts, 11 
of which were consummated by third party bidders competing 
with management. He implies the median (mean) 8'l. (14%) 
additional third party premium confirms management 
underpricing. Amihud (1989) cites Easterwood, Hsieh and 
Singer, Kieschnick, and his own results when concluding the 
difference between buyout premiums offered by management and 
third party bidders are insignificant. 
Grammatikos and Swary (cited in Amihud, 1989) note 
firms targeted by management earn a risk adjusted 11'l.-14'l. 
less than firms targeted by third parties. Similarly, 
DeAngelo et al. (1987) find the median market value to net 
tangible book value ratio is marginally lower for 01anagement 
led buyouts. In contrast, Amihud's (1989, p. 20) sample 
"outperformed the market" for the five year period preceding 
buyout. 
The inconclusive evidence outlined above prompted 
research which examined divisional buyouts, management 
ownership, and the effects of bid rescission. 
Information asymmetry is more pronounced in full rather 
than divisional leveraged buyouts. Monitoring costs for 
public stockholders exceed the (shared) benefits derived 
from this activity. In contrast, the parent company has 
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incentive to expend resources since it receives the benefits 
from monitoring divisional management (Amihud, 1989), Hite 
and Vetsuypens (cited in Amihud, 1989) note stock price 
increases in full LBDs are comparable to size adjusted stock 
price increases resulting from divisional LBDs. Furthermore, 
full buyouts do not return to public ownership mor-e often or 
faster than divisional buyouts, which would be expected if 
the equity was systematically underpriced (Kaplan, 1991). 
Kaplan (1989b) also finds significant management non-
participation i~ buyouts (9.661.), and unusually high 
management turnover around the event date. This would be 
highly irrational behaviour for informed managers aware of 
bid underpricing. 
In addition, 747. of management initiated leveraged 
buyouts which failed to proceed were purchased by third 
parties (Kaplan, 1989b). This is consistent with a 
competitive corporate control market extracting high prices. 
Financial securities designed to allow high casil flow 
multiples to be paid (PIK, Zeros) attenuate underpricing 
concerns and grant participation in future value increases 
(Randhawa, 1990). That is, they reduce information asymmetry 
costs. 
Smith (1990) concludes that managers do not exploit 
private information since third party leveraged buyouts 
achieve increases in cash flow equivalent to divisional 
buyouts. Alternatively, cash flow tends not to increase when 
buyout offers do not proceed. This corresponds with the 
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finding that preferred stock price increases are not 
sustained when offers are rescinded, suggesting information 
asymmetry is negligible (Marais, Schipper & Smith, 1989). 
DeAngelo (1986) found no evidence of managers 
manipulating accounting earnings to artificially depress 
stock prices prior to the buyout. The potential conflict of 
interest is mitigated by the high level of litigation 
associated with these transactions. Stockholders may request 
an independent valuation of their stocks under the app~·aisal 
statutes in Delaware law. When determining value the courts 
rely on earnings levels, ratios and market prices. The 
prospect of detailed scrutiny of the offer and real personal 
wealth losses enforce implicit fiduciary contracts. 
Therefore, it. would appear that competitive acquisition 
markets and litigation risk ccmbine to reduce the effects of 
info~mation asymmetry during the bidding process, Management 
bidding groups do not exp~opriate wealth from pre-buyout 
stockholders. 
The Impact on Long Term Investments. 
The prima~y objective in leveraged buyouts is to 
gene~ate ca~h flow to amortise debt obligations. If short 
term cash flow increases are sourced from pervasive cutbacks 
in investment, then long term competitiveness may be 
adve~sely affected. A reduction in discretionary expenditure 
is not necessarily detrimental; terminating negative net 
present value investments for example, increases firm value. 
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Kaplan (1989b) reports a decrease in median industry 
adjusted capital expenditure from -8/. preceding buyout to -
36/. for the two year period framing the event date. Dividing 
by sales to control for divestiture yields -4/. and -171., 
respectively. Smith (1990) and Muscarella et al. (1990) 
confirm the downward trend in median capital expenditure to 
sales ratios. The latter note a decline of 11/. between LBO 
and public offering, which is worse than 86/. of random 
selectjons. Muscarella et al. (19901 findings should be 
interpreted with care however, as the sample contains only 
25 buyouts. 
Lichtenberg et al. (1990) find mean relative R&D 
intensity is lower for the three post-buyout years than for 
any of the seven pre-buyout years. R&D staffing levels and 
expenditure both decline, though the results are not 
significant. Figure 2.3 delineates mean differences in R&D 
intensity between buyouts and industry control firms. 
The most conspicuous feature of the graph is the 
negative R&D intensity for each of the seven years prior to 
buyout. This is consistent with the hypothesis that buyout 
targets reside in non-R&D intensive industries, and their 
R&D intensity is below industry average (Lichtenberg et al., 
1990). 
More research is required to resolve the long term 
investment issue. Given that reduced capital and R&D 
expenditure may reflect reJection of wasteful or positive 
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NPV investments, researchers must devise tests which will 
extract these effects before conclusions are drawn. 
Figure 2.3 
RIJ,.D INTENSITY 
-4~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~------------------------j 
Year 
l!l!ll Expenditure/Sales 12221 Employ.IT. Employ. 
Soureo: Lioht&n berg at mi. (1990) 
The majority of studies which evaluate the economic 
performance of leveraged buyouts conclude that the benefits 
are not solely composed of expropriations from company 
stakeholders. The stock premium and post-buyout operating 
and productivity improvements are sufficiently large to 
indemnify transfers that undoubtedly occur from bondholders. 
Indenture protection voluntarily waived by investment grade 
bondholders casts doubt on their claims of injustice. 
The macroeconomy is expected to benefit from taxation 
assessments served on LBO participants, however, the 
microeconomic consequences of a redistribution in tax 
liabilities is uncertain. The evidence does not support the 
0 
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notion of systematic redundancies funding buvaut gains, 
although premature pension terminations contribute to stock 
premiums, Managers do not exploit privy information to the 
detriment of pre-buyout stockholders. Leveraged buyouts do 
not occur in R&D intensive industries or companies, but the 
impact of these transactions on positive NPV investments is 
inconclusive. 
Therefore, the evidence generally supports the 
hypothesis that economic wealth is created by leveraged 
buyouts rather than merely redistributed. The results have 
important connotations for managers, practitioners, policy 
makers and academics concerned with the implementation, 
regulatLon and analysis of these t~ansactions. The fo~mer 
may const~uct deals that maximise gains and avoid pitfalls, 
whereas the latter may focus on identified areas of 
empirical weakness as a guide for further research. 
• 
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CHAPTER 3 
Th~ TheoreticaJ Framework 
The theoretical framework outlines the scope of the 
thesis and identifies variables pertinent to research 
objectives presented in Chapter One, The framework is 
derived from those aforementioned concepts and theories 
which possess empirical substance. This chapter establishes 
the terms of reference for the research methodology 
developed in Chapter Four. 
3.1 Scope 
To determine whether Australian leveraged buyouts 
exhibit characteristics si~ilar to LEOs performed in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, this thesis examines 
three particular issues: 
(i) Industry and corporate characteristics of Australian 
leveraged buyout target companies; 
(ii) The ownership and capital structures of Australian 
leveraged buyouts; and 
(iii) The financial performance of Australian leveraged 
buyout companies. 
Therefore, this thesis is concerned with exploratory 
research into the Australian buyout phenomenon. No attempt 
is made to estimate the distribution of future cash flows 
among stockholders, bondholders, taxpayers, and empl6yees, 
since this task is more suited to large sample studies. 
a. 
Theoretical Framework 77 
3.2 Variables 
The following variables are expected to have an impact 
on leveraged buyouts in Australia. The direction of the 
expected relationship is indicated. 
(i) To test the proposition that Australian leveraged buyout 
target companies exhibit stable cash flow, proxies for 
industry and corporate attributes have been developed. 
Industrial characteristj.cs of the main business line: 
Mature sector 
Low growth 
Non-cyclical 
Low technological requirements 
Business attributes of the buyout target company: 
Leading market share or strong market niche 
Established brands, mundane products 
Product or market diversification 
(iil To examine the proposition that Australian leve~aged 
buyouts concent~ate equity owne~ship among manage~s, 
di~ectors, employ2es and specialists: 
- Ownership percentages of managers, di~ectors, 
employees and specialists are calculated as at 
acquisition date 
(iii) Ratio and descriptive analysis tests the proposition 
that Aust~alian leveraged buyouts have extensively geared 
capital structures: 
- Debt/assets, long term debt/assets ratios 
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- Multiple financing layers, strip financing, equity 
kickers 
(iv) Performance ratios test the proposition that Australian 
leveraged buyout companies produce relatively strong 
financial results: 
EBIT/sales, EBIT/assets ratios 
Sales/employees, profit/employees ratios 
Days creditors outstanding 
Days receivables outstanding 
Days inventory 
Capital commitments/fixed assets ratios 
EBIT ratios have the advantage of nullifying the 
effects of the capital structure, since earnings are 
measured before interest and tax charges. The sales or 
~ssets denominator is a partial control for acquisitions and 
divestitures used by most researchers. The ratios will 
exceed the industry median if high profit margins and 
efficient capital utilisation are achieved. 
Employee ratios measure the relative productivity and 
profitability of the workforce, where high ratios indicate 
strong performance. 
The three working capital ratios are measures of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of short term capital 
management. They may be considered in isolation or combined 
as the cash cycle (CCJ: 
CC ~ Days receivable + Days inventory - Days creditors 
•• 
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An efficient company would lower the cash cycle by 
reducing days receivable and days inventory, and increasing 
days creditors outstanding. That is, using trade creditors 
to fund purchases for the period. 
The Capital commitments/Fixed assets rat~o proxies for 
corporate expansion plans. It is an attempt to discern 
whether leveraged buyouts punitively defer capital 
expenditures for the sake of current interest payments. 
The relative impact of the variables differ according 
to the buyout's unique circumstances. However, Australian 
leveraged buyouts are expected to exhibit at least some of 
the characteristics outlined. 
• 
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The multiple case design is the most app~opriate method 
for examining leveraged buyouts in Australia, given the 
paucity of domestic research and hence, limited 
understanding of the phenomenon. This thesis compiles data 
from a broad range of public and private sources, and 
conducts qualitative and quantitative analysis on a number 
of companies. 
4.1 Design 
Multiple case design commences with the selection of 
companies for analysis. Cases are selected according to 
literal and theoretical replication principles (Yin, 1984). 
Centurion Industries Limited, Joyce Corporation Limited 
and Automotive Components Limited are examples of literal 
replication. These manufacturing companies acquired during 
the mid-eighties were subjected to similar economy-wide 
events, and they exemplify the knowledge of leveraged buyout 
transactions that prevailed at the time. 
Leigh-Mardon Pty Ltd, McEwans Limited, and the Bibra 
Lakes Unit Trust (Adventure World) were acquired in 1990, 
and accordingly reflect different macroeconomic factors and 
investor sophistication (theoretical replication). 
The research proceeds by conducting individual case 
studies. Centurion, Joyce and Automotive Components are 
analysed in depth. By virtue of their mid-eighties buyout, 
there is at least five years post-buyout performance data. 
' 
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Leigh-Ma~don, McEwans and Adventure World cases do not 
include performance analysis due to potentially spurious 
outcomes resulting from a single post-buyout year. These 
latter buyouts are included primarily to contrast their 
capital structures with tho~P formulated under more 
favourable interest rate conditions. 
Finally, conclusions may be drawn from cross-case 
analysis by generalising results to theory. 
4.2 Data Collection 
The data were collected from the following sources: 
(i) Industry ratios were extracted from the Stock Exchange 
Financial and Profitability Reports of 1988 and 1992. The 
Summary Report and specific industry reports were utilised 
(Table 4,1). 
Table 4.1 
ASX Industry Reoqrts 
Company 
Centurion Industries 
Joyce Corporation 
Automotive Components 
IG No. 
11 
22 
22 
IG No. = Industry Gi-oup Number 
Industry Report 
Enginef!ring 
Misc. Industrials 
Misc. Industrials 
Automotive Components Limited has remained privately owned. 
It was assigned to the Miscellaneous Industrials group since 
most other firms in the (formerly) Automotive category were 
designated as Industry Group Number 22. 
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(ii) Company data were extracted from annual reports, 
prospectuses, investment proposals and funding submissions. 
The data were obtained from Austr·alian Stock Exchange 
microfiche, company directors, chartered accountants, and 
investment bankers. 
4.3 Data Analysi5 
The data were analysed by assigning the buyout date as 
time 0, the first complete post-buyout financial year +1, 
and so on. Median industry ratios were preferred due to the 
presence of skewed distributions resulting from dominant 
companies. 
Industry adjustments were performed by subtracting the 
median industry ratio from the corresponding company ratio 
each year, for the five year post-buyout period. Ratios 
utilised in this thesis are defined in Appendix A. 
4.4 Limitations 
Limitations which may affect the ve~acity of thesis 
conclusions are outlined below: 
(i) Accounting ~atios may be inapprop~iate for measu~ing 
true pe~fo~mance, due to management influence over 
accounting policies. Howeve~, all pe~formance data lS 
ext~acted f~om audited accounts. 
(ii) Changes in accounting ~atios ave~ time may proxy fo~ 
othe~ unde~lying va~iables which remain unknown. 
(iii) Centurion, Joyce and Automotive Components a~e all 
divisional/subsidia~y leve~aged buyouts. Therefore, p~e­
buyout financial data is unavailable. It is possible that 
0. 
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the division/subsidiary performed better prior to the 
buyout. 
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(iv) Reliance on private provision of data inherent in 
leveraged buyout research in Australia, may bias data toward 
successful transactions. That is, a reluctance on the part 
of principals to release data on failed buyouts. However, 
this thesis analyses McEwans Limited, which had a receiver 
manager appointed in August 1992. 
0. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Centurion Industries Limited 
5.1 Background 
Partmont Pty Ltd acquired the Western Australian assets 
of Tomlinson Steel Limited (a subsidiary of Clyde Industries 
Limited) through a leveraged buyout in September 1985. The 
management and employee led buyout was partially in response 
to threatened closure of certain Tomlinson operations. The 
buyout was completed with the assistance of Western Capital 
Limited, a significant equity investor in the transaction. 
Through a succession of name changes the buyout entity 
was eventua 11 y registered as Centurion Industries Limited on 
September 23 1986. Fourteen months after the leveraged 
buyout, Centurion listed on the main board of the Exchange 
through a public offering (November, 1986). 
5.2 Industry Characteristics 
Centurion is a heavy engineering company with 
established operations in steel fabrication, heat treatment, 
mechanical and non-de:. true ti ve testing, heat form, ro 11 ing 
stock and boiler manufacturing and servicing. These 
operations have been performed by Centurion (Tomlin son) for 
several decades with processes that appear relatively 
routine. Although upgradings and refinements may improve 
operations, contemporary processes and products are not 
unlike those of past years. FurthPI-more, there would be 
little opportunity for new entrants to introduce new 
processes and gain comparative advantage. Accordingly, the 
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indust~y within which Centurion resides may be classi~ied as 
mature. 
The industry services an established clientele since 
the specialised nature of the products limits market appeal. 
The economic downturn preceding the btJyout ensured short to 
medium term increases in demand could be accomodated within 
existing industry capacity. Hence, at the time of the 
buyout, the industry exhibited low growth prospects. 
Although the manufacture of new boilers, rolling stock 
and pressure vessels are subject to the economic cycle, 
their 011going maintenance, testing. spare parts and 
ancillary services mitigate revenue foregone from postponed 
production orders. For example, rolling stock and pressure 
vessels are produced for the mining and energy sectors. New 
purchase orders may reflect the commodity price level, 
ho~1ever, maintenance is required to protect existing 
investment. 
The manufacturing and testing technology associated 
with the industry appears to be conventional, established 
and with low probability of obsolescence. As alluded to 
previously, the technological processes are relatively 
routine and do not require extensive development. While 
heavy engineering is capital intensive its technological 
investment is quite robust. 
Therefore, Centurion's industrial sector is consistent 
with theoretical expectations of a leveraged buyout 
candidate. Centurion's heavy engineering industry has 
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mature, low growth! low technological processes, where 
servlce business accords some protection against economic 
cycles. Waite and Fridsan·s (1989) LBO intensity ratios for 
fabricated metals (2.7) and non-electrical machinery (2.5) 
industri~s are just below the manufacturing average (3.0) 
Hence these industries are LED intensive in the United 
States. 
5.3 Business A:t:J;.I:i..butes of the T.:~rget Company 
Centurion forged a strong market niche within the heavy 
engineering sector. Its divisional operations have been 
established for several years, and the economic downturn 
immediately preceding the buyout eliminated several 
competitors. 
Centurion maintained a virtual monopoly in boiler 
servicing and spare parts, a potentially profitable 
arrangement given Tomlinson Steel alone installed over 340 
boilers in WA. In addition, Centurion was the Australian 
agent for Hoval and Buderus boilers, and had an exclusive 
licence for the manufacture and marketing of Heatform 
fireplaces in Australia. 
In steel fabrication, Steel Mains Pty Ltd was 
Centurion's only West Australian based competitor capable of 
providing design through to installation services. 
Similarly, there were two WA competitors in the rolling 
stock construction market, however, Centurion possessed 
design drawings, shop facilities and personnel expertise 
advantages. In addition, distance and prohibitive 
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transportation charges formed an effective barrier against 
Eastern states entrants. 
Centurion was the leading commercial heat treater with 
only three local competitors. The non-destructive and 
mechanical testing operations of the firm also had only 
three local competitors. 
Therefore, Centurion established a strong market niche 
with few significant competitors. Monopolistic and 
oligopolistic markets, reinforced by franchise agreements, 
suggests the company was not subject to predatory pricing. 
Leveraged buyout proponents were reasonably assured of a 
stable cash flow base quite resilient to economic downturns 
and industry contractions. 
The product line of Centurion may be described as 
mundane. Fire and water tube boilers, rolling stock, 
pressure vessels and tanks are relatively primitive 
products. The diversified product line and client register 
ensured Centurion was not reliant on a single market or 
client for a major proportion of its profits. Mundane 
products and diversified lines are consistent with low 
business risk, because the firm is less susceptible to risks 
of technological obsolescence or market collapse. 
5.4 EQuity Ownership 
Table 5.1 discloses the pattern of stock ownership when 
the leveraged buyout was initiated. The fully diluted equity 
ownership refers to the position immediately after options 
to subscribe for ordinary stocks have been exercised. 
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Table 5.1 
EQuity Ownership 
Fully Diluted 
Owner 'l. Cum'l. 'l. Cum% 
Rob less 3 10 
Wright 3 6 10 20 
Bal. managers, employees 47 53 32 52 
Western Cap1tal Limited 47 100 48 100 
The ownership percentages of senior executives (Robless 
and Wright) are consistent with those reported in the 
empirical review. For example, Kaplan (1989b) and Muscarella 
et al. (1990) note executive stock ownership of 23/. and 26/. 
respectively. Centurion's ownership pattern is most similar 
to Smith (1990), who found median senior executive ownership 
of 17%, and major investors of 49/.. 
Therefore, the high percentage of equity owned by 
executives, managers and employees aligns their wealth 
maximisation incentives with firm value. Residual claims on 
the fi~m's assets motivate cash flow gene~ation and ~educe 
perquisite consumption. In addition, the significant Western 
Capital presence provides enhanced corporate governance over 
activities not covered by implicit contracts. The reduction 
in agency casts associated with the concentration of equity 
ownership increases claim value because monito~ing costs 
originally capitalised in the stock price are removed. 
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5.5 Cepital Structure 
The capital structure immediately after the buyout was 
extensively geared. The total debt to assets ratio was 841., 
and the long term debt to assets ratio was 641.. These 
results are similar to those recorded in the empirical 
review (pp. 49-50), 
The capital structure contained four distinct levels of 
financing: (i) Senior secured, (iil Vendor, (iii) Cumulative 
redeemable convertible preference shares, and (iv) Ordinary 
shares. For a total consideration of S2.36M, this would be 
the extent to which the capital structure could feasibly be 
layered. Strip financing and equity kickers were not used in 
the transaction. The senior credit and vendor financing were 
both secured, hence conflicts of interest between debt and 
equity holders in the event of default would remain. 
Therefore, the proportion of debt in the capital 
structure is consistent with the distribution of free cash 
flow under Jensen's (1989) hypothesis. The high percentage 
of senior secured lending (64/.) attenuates agency costs of 
debt, since senior claims protected by indenture provisions 
do not require costly monitoring. However, as noted above, 
distinct layers of capital do not reduce bankruptcy costs 
impounded in highly levered transactions. 
Also consistent with Jensen (1989), Centurion maintains 
a highly geared capital structure up to five years after the 
buyout, even though ~tacks and convertible notes were issued 
to the public. This implies that management recognise the 
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benefits of debt, rather than merely utilising it as an 
acquisition medium. 
5.6 Financjal Performance 
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The fact that Centurion remained private for only 
fourteen months provides an opportunity to examine the 
effectiveness of the leveraged buyout as a restructuring 
mechanism. 
Centurion's EBIT on sales and assets ratios clearly 
exceed the corresponding 1ndustry medians (Figure 5.1), 
Comparatively high EBIT/Sales implies wide profit margins, 
probably as a result of strong niche markets allowing cost 
increases to be passed on to customers. The positive 
EBIT/Assets series reflects Centurion's relativ8ly high 
operating efficiency. These results are consistent with 
Muscarella et al. (19901, Kitching (1989) and Kaplan 
(1989b). Note that both ratios peak in the private ownership 
period. 
In contrast, Centurion's employee efficiency 
utilisation (Sales/Employees) has been substantially below 
the median industry level for all post-buyout years, except 
t+5. This indicates that revenue growth has failed to match 
the growth in Cerd.:urion's workforce (44 to 193, or 34'l. pa). 
However, profitability per employee has e~ceeded the 
industry median by a range of 80/. to 159'l., with the latter 
achieved in the private ownership period. :herefore, 
Centurion's post-buyout performance is partially due to cost 
cutting, as distinct from revenue increases. 
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Figure 5.1 
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Centurion's cash conversion cycle deteriorated because 
of the excessive time taken to procure cash from debtors, 
and the willingness to pay trade creditors more promptly 
than industry competitors. Table 5.2 synthesises data 
pertaining to net working capital management. Although this 
study's t+l cash conversion is 13% faster than the industry 
median, subsequent results indicate the firm's working 
capital costs are too high. 
The low capital commitments to fixed assets ratios for 
Centurion and the industry median indicate stable growth 
preferred by leveraged buyouts. The relatively large t+l 
commitment by Centurion suggests cash flow is not generated 
at the expense of long horizon investment decisions, rather 
the need for capital investment is low. 
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Table 5.2 
Casb c~~l~ 
Indust~y Adjusted Days 1 2 3 4 5 
Inventory 31• 19 10 1 7 
Receivables 9 1 -24 6 -16 
Creditors 9 - 8 - 6 -10 - 2 
Cash Cycle 13 10 -20 -15 -11 
A positive result indicates inventory and receivables days 
less than the industry median, and/or trade creditors days 
more than the industry median. 
a, Industry inventory (71) - Centurion inventory (40) = 31. 
Therefore, Centurion satisfies most of the theoretical 
requirements for a leveraged buyout candidate. The industry 
is mature, with low growth and technology needs. Exposure to 
economic cycles is attenuated by Centurion's strong market 
niche in established heavy engineering products and 
services. 
The restructuring of Centurion's ownership ar1d capital 
is generally consistent with United States and United 
Kingdom experiences. Intensive equity ownership among staff 
and major investors! and the debt induced threat of 
insolvency provides incentive to reduce costs and improve 
cash flow. Centurion's post-buyout performance indicates the 
firm has been partially successful in this regard. While 
EBIT on sales and assets! and profit on employee ratios 
consistently outperformed the industry median, opportunities 
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to reduce costs through active net working capital 
management have nat been taken. 
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Through the turn of the decade, Centurion acquired 
plant and product rights of Davmar Pty Ltd, a 25% interest 
in Cryofab Industries Ltd, and 100/. in Fusco Cameron and 
Fusco Enginef~ring. By July 1991 Natsteel Equity 2 Pte Ltd 
(Singapore) had acquired 66% of Centurion's stock as a 
result of its Part A takeover offer valued at $6,569,045. 
This represents a value increase of 23/. pa since the buyout. 
0. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Joyce Corporation Limited 
6.1 Background 
Joyce Corporation Limited emerged from the December 
1984 leveraged buyout of Joyce (WA), a division of George 
Weston Foods Ltd. Joyce remained under private ownership for 
a period of two years, listing on the main board of the 
Exchange through a public offering in December 1986. 
6.2 Industry Characterjstjcs 
At the buyout date, Joyce was principally involved in 
the manufacture and sale of furniture. The company had 
bedding, hospital equipment, wood and steel furniture, and 
foam product lines. Joyce has been a significant participant 
in the industry since the 1930s and it is suggested that 
while product lines and processes are revised, they are 
generally derivatives of preceding years and not 
fundamentally new. Given the basic design of furniture is 
well established, the industry is considered to be mature. 
When the buyout was initiated Joyce had material 
exposure to the construction i.1dustry~ and the West 
Australian housing sector in particular. This market 
experiences volatile conditions that are sensitive to 
interest rates, hence, the furniture industry is subject to 
variation in demand and growth resulting from economic 
cycles. The industry does not have stable profit margins, a 
problem when floating rate interest commitments are 
increasing. 
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Although Joyce had low technological needs when 
se~vicing local indust~y, the agg~essive expansion programme 
undertaken after the buyout diversified products and 
processes, which led to the introduction of robotic and 
computer controlled lines. Hence, Joyce Corporation's plant 
and equipment technology immediately prior to the buyout was 
inappropriate, if not obsolete, for the firm's future 
aspirations. 
Therefo~e, Joyce Corporation's industry sector 
exhibited mixed r-esults in terms of leveraged buyout 
suitability. The sector was well developed and mature, 
however it failed the growth, economic cycle and technology 
tests. Prima facie, the industry did not appear to be 
conducive to leveraged buyouts, a conclusion supported by 
Waite and Fridson·s (1989) poor furniture industry LED-
intensity measure (1.1). 
6.3 Business Attributes of the Target Company 
In December 1984, Joyce was one of the largest 
furniture manufacturers in Australia, with substantial 
market shares in household and hospital ma~kets. The 
principal products related to beds, bedding and ancillary 
goods, and all were established production lines of over 
fifty years duration. 
Joyce Corporation's substantial market presence and 
product development led to award winning products with well 
known, respected brand names, eg. Pipe-Line beds. This 
enabled Joyce products to be differentiated from 
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substitutes, an important consideration for such basic 
merchandise. The conventional nature of the products reduces 
the risk from obsolescence and moderates research and 
development expenditure. 
Joyce Corporation's products and markets were not 
notably diverse at the time of the buyout. The hospital 
market partially balanced cyclical returns from the housing 
sector. Acquisitions made in the first financial year after 
the buyout improved Joyce Corpo-ation·s product and mark~t 
range. Joyce acquired substantial exposure to leisure 
furniture (Supafurn) and the Australia/New Zealand franchise 
for Ther-A-Pedic (Sierra Bedding). In addition, the firm 
acquire8 the rights to produce Nesbitt Evans hospital beds 
in Australia, New Zealand and South East Asia. 
Joyce established a Singapore branch in 1985 and 
vigorously pursued foreign markets. Joyce became the largest 
furniture maker in Australia with more than 1,500 product 
outlets nationwide. 
Therefore, when the buyout was initiated, Joyce had 
strong market share in the furniture industry with well 
known and respected brand name .products. Acquisitions 
completed in the year following the buyout reinforced Joyce 
Corporation's strength through product and market 
diversification, exclusive franchise agreements and 
widespread distribution capability, Hence, via strategic 
acquisition, Joyce established a cash flow base more 
resilient to general economic conditions, 
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6,4 Egujty Ownership 
The pattern of stock ownership in Joyce when the 
leveraged buyout was initiated is outlined in Table 6.1. 
Because all stocks were owned by managers and directors, 
wealth incentives were aligned with firm value maximisation. 
The substantial ownership stake of the Chairman (Mr. 
Smetana) might explain the entrepreneurial management 
displayed throughout the late eighties. The absence of a 
specialist LBO equity investor in the transaction highlights 
the role of debt obligations and bankruptcy risk in 
disciplining managerial decision making. 
Table 6.1 
CQuity Ownership 
Owner 
Smetana 
Carkeek 
Swanson 
Troll ope 
Other 
No. 
950,001 
150,001 
150,001 
150,001 
240,002 
'l. 
58 
9 
9 
9 
15 
Cum/. 
67 
76 
85 
100 
The high level of management commitment to the company 
was reflected in the.•ir- equity ownership. Banks ar-e more 
willing to finance deals when managers own a significant 
stake in the company (bankers refer to management stock 
ownership as 'sweat equity· or- 'hurt mGney" ). Mr Smetana 
owned over 40/. of Joyce Corporation's fully paid issued 
I, 
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stocks as at October 1991, almost seven years after the 
buyout, 
6.5 Capjtal Structure 
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The total debt to assets ratio was 76% and the long 
term debt to assets ratio was 48%, at the buyout date. 
The high proportion of debt in the capital structure 
ensures free cash flow is distributed rather than 
accumulated. The provision of debt capital from a single 
senior lender is consistent with the hypothesis that 
intensive debt ownersh.i.p serves as an institutional monitor 
of management behaviour, in this case, in lieu of a 
specialist equity investor. Debt covenants cost effectively 
monitor management thr-ough ongoing r-atio r-equirements. 
Although strip financing and equity kickers were not 
included in the buyout's funding, debt arranged by a single 
lending institution facilitates work-outs in the event of 
default. Because there is only one entity i'lvolved in the 
renegotiation process, flexible financing packages can be 
arr3nged provided going cancer" value exceeds liquidation 
value. 
Joyce used an extensive)y geared capital structure for 
the five year period following the buyout, pr'imarily to 
finance an aggressive expansion campaign. Australia's 
relatively high inflation rates during this period meant 
Joyce could benefit from a reduction in real fixed rate 
borrowing costs, and from the reintroduction of negative 
gearing (1987). The debt ratio remained very high by 
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industry standards, despite management's stated intention to 
reduce debt to more prudent levels (Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2 
Debt/Assets Ratios % 
Joyce 
Industry 
6.6 Finaocjal Performance 
1 
59 
30 
2 
51 
35 
3 
69 
21 
4 
65 
27 
5 
61 
26 
Joyce Corporation's EBIT on sales and assets ratios 
have consistently exceeded industry medians. Marginal 
EBIT/Sales results in t+2, 4 and 5 reflect the sensitivity 
of Joyce profit margins to economic conditions (Figure 6.1), 
The EBIT/Assets calculations indicate that tie company 
utilises its capital more efficiently than industry 
competitor-s. 
In CQntrast to capital utilisation, Joyce has 
indifferent employee efficiency and profitability ratios. 
Industry adjusted sales per employee ~atios are positive in 
yea~s t+4 and 5 only, and indust~y adjusted profitability 
ratios are positive in year t+3 only. The larg~ inc~ease in 
employees resu 1 ting fr-om the acquisition pr-ogr-amn1e and 
subsequent ~aticnalisation due to the recession, may 
confound these ~atios. However-, the capital investment in 
new technology in 1986/B-;'' should have indut:ed improved 
employee efficiency. 
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Figure 6.1 
EBIT RATIOS 
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Joyce Corporation limited 
100 
Joyce Corporation's net working capital management for 
the three years following the buyout was substantially worse 
than the industry median. Stock was held for excessive 
periods, receivables took too long to collect and creditors 
were paid more promptly than the industry median. Years t+4 
and 5 show a marked reversal in the length of the cash 
cycle, with most gains attributable to reduced stock holding 
periods and deferred trade creditor payments (Table 6.3). 
Capital commitments on fixed assets ratios could not be 
calculated for Joyce due to the failure to disclose capital 
expenditure incurred but not yet provided for. This 
disclosure is not mandatory. 
Table 6.3 
Cash Cycl(? 
Industry Adjusted Days 
Inventory 
Receivables 
Creditors 
Cash Cycle 
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1 2 
-22• -16 
-20 6 
- 3 3 
-45 -25 
* Sum not exact due to rounding. 
3 
-98 
-51 
70 
-79 
101 
4 5 
11 20 
2 - 2 
9 8 
23* 27"' 
A positive result indicates inventory and receivables days 
less than the industry median, and/or trade creditors days 
more than the industry median. 
a. Industry inventory (61) -Joyce inventory (83) = -22. 
Joyce Corporation·s suitability as a leveraged buyout 
is dependent on the relative impact of opposing forces. 
While the furniture industry was mature and Joyce had 
significant market share and established brand name 
products, demand sensitivity to economic cycles made growth 
rates unstable. Product and market diversification acquired 
after the buyout required advanced technology funded 
primarily with debt, increas~ng debt servicing commitments. 
The capital and ownership structures of Joyce 
Corporation at the LBO date were consistent with theoretical 
expectatior1s. The highly geared capital structure was 
predominantly funded with long term debt, and management 
owned all issued stocks. Unlike most leveraged buyouts, 
Joyce did not significantly reduce debt commitments. Debt to 
•• 
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gross cash flow ratios clearly exceed the industry median, 
suggesting Joyce does not generate sufficient cash flow to 
amortise its debt. For example, assuming no additional debt 
capital is raised and gross cash flow remains constant, it 
would take Joyce over 16 years to amortise its debt (as at 
30/06/91). The equivalent industry median is 2.33 years. 
Joyce Corporation's financial performance has been 
mixed. The company has achieved high industry adJL!sted EBIT 
ratios for each post-buyout year and during all economic 
conditions. Recently the firm showed positive trends in 
sales an employees and cash cycle ratios, perhaps signalling 
a return to fundamental management issues. However, the firm 
posted its worst operating loss in its 105 year ~istory in 
1991. The interest costs on Joyce's financial debt exceeded 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Returning the firm 
to more prudent gearing is the prim& objective of the 
corporation. 
•• 
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CHAPTER 7 
' 
' Automotive Components Limited 
7.1 Backgrmmd 
The Ariadne Group acquired Repco Corporation Limited 
with the intention of divesting its manufacturing division:;. 
The Brake and Clutch division was purchased by BBA Plc, and 
the Engine Parts Division f·~as acquired by Third Nettebin Pty 
Ltd for $38M, in a 1986 leve,~aged buyout. The shelf company 
subsequently became Automotive Components Limited CACL), and 
has remained privately owned. 
7.2 Industry Characterjstjcs 
ACL manufacture pistons, engine bearings, valve seat 
in5erts, engine gears, brake and ignition parts, soft and 
hard gaskets, base cork and rubber materials. Most of these 
manufacturing processes were established in the 1930-1940s, 
with the most recent commissioned in 1962. 
Many of the above manufacturing processes produce 
components whic..:h are technically well developed and suited 
to mass pr·c..duc:tion. This is because the automotive industry 
utilises engine and other components between models to avoid 
immense re-tooling costs. Engine components enjoy long 
production runs and engine staples such as bearings, gaskets 
and piston rings for example, are unlikely to be developed 
much beyond their present form. Hence, in general, the core 
industry is mature. 
When the buyout was initiated the automotive indu~ ::.ry 
had low growth prospects. The introduction of Fringe 
.. 
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Benefits Tax and a falling Australian dollar made the 
industry's contraction more severe. Industry growth 
prospects wEre expected to be limited, however~ short term 
growth could be absorbed by existing surplus capacity. 
ACL is exposed to cyclical swings in consumer demand 
resulting from the automotive industry's sensitivity to 
interest and exchange rates. As a durable good, new motor 
vehicle purchases may be deferred in tight economic 
conditions, having flow on effects for original equipment 
and replacement market suppliers. 
Long established products and processes imply that the 
industry technology base is relatively stable. Cutting, 
pressing, milling and forging are engineering processes 
which have been refined over many years. Basic automotive 
components do not require advanced technology to capitalise 
on economies of scale. 
Therefore, the automotive industry demonstrates 
attributes synonymous with leveraged buyouts. The industry 
is mature, with low growth prospects and low technology 
requirements. However, the industry is subject to economic 
cycles. The next sectiCJ:-l may indicate corporate attributes 
which mitigate the downside from exposure to a cyclic 
economy. 
7.3 Busioe5s Attribytes pf the Target Company 
ACL has dominant market shares in original equipment 
and aftermarket products in Australia. ACL's engine 
components are used in Australian engines built by Ford, 
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Holden, Toyota, Mitsubishi and Nissan, enabling 
manufacturing economies of scale to be achieved. ACL Bearing 
Company is the sole Australian manufacturer of precision 
bearings for domestic vehicle manufacturing and replacement 
markets, and ACL Gasket Company is the major supplier of 
soft and hard gaskets to lhese same markets. 
ACL has established a reputation for precision 
engineering products in Australia, with accompanying brand 
recognition benefits. Respected brands facilitate 
differentiation from substitutes, which is important to 
manufacturers of basic products like engine bearings, 
gaskets and rubber industrial flooring. 
ACL's products and markets are well diversified, making 
the company more resilient to vagaries in the economy and 
the Australian automotive industry in particular. The 
product range includes engine, transmission, brake and 
ignition parts, cork and rubber products for transport, 
flooring, foundation slab, footwear, sport and household 
applications. ACL produces components for automotive, 
industrial and whitegoods industries in Australia and 
overseas. Its sales are represented by (i) Original 
equipment (33%), (iil Replacement (33%), (iii) Industrial 
(17%) and (iv) Export (17'l.) markets. Hence, ACL is not 
dependent on any one product or customer for its 
profitability. 
Therefore, ACL has a dominant market share, established 
brands, basic products, and considerable product and market 
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diversification. These attributes are indicative of low 
business risk since stable cash flow should be generated 
through all economic and business cycles. Low business risk 
is a prerequisite for leveraged buyouts. 
7.4 EQuity Ownershjp 
The ACL leveraged buyout was completed with the 
assistance of two equity investors, the Australian Industry 
Development Corporation Limited and Citicorp Capital 
Investors Australia Ltd. The equity ownership pattern in 
Table 7.1 is similar to foreign buyouts with the management 
stake closely resembling equivalently sized UK firms (Wright 
et al., 1991). 
Table 7.1 
EQuity Ownership 
After Syndication 
Owner Cum'l. 7. Cum% 
Man~gement group 40 40 
Employees 40 10 50 
AIDC Ltd 45 85 20 70 
Citicorp Capital 15 100 15 85 
BLE Capital 100 15 100 
The intensive ownership structure is consistent with 
theoretical e~pectations of increased managerial incentives 
and reduced agency costs, resulting from wealth dependence 
on residual claims and effective corporate governance by 
sophisticated investors. The concentration of equity 
' .. 
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ownership should improve cash flow generation and operating 
performance since manag2rs and employees have a personal 
stake in the compar.y. 
7.5 Capital Structure 
The total debt to assets ratio was 71/. when the buyout 
was initiated, with the long term debt to assets ratio being 
60'l.. Debt capital was originally provided in the form of a 
$23.5M term loan facility (AIDC Ltd) and $7.5M of vendor 
financing, A refinancing eventually syndicated the debt 
among three institutions: AIDC Ltd ($13M), NAB Ltd ($8.5M) 
and SBV ($8.5M). 
The provision of debt and equity capital by AIDC Ltd is 
a derivative strip financing arrangement. Holding debt and 
equity claims reduces the threat of premature liquidation 
since equity losses offset increased debt recovery (Arzac, 
1992) . 
ACL has maintained gearing levels in excess of the 
industry median for the five years after the buyout, though 
at 41% and 26% (t+5), respectively, the difference is not 
significant. 
Therefore, the high gearing level bonds the promise to 
disburse free cash flow to investors. Syndication of debt 
capital does not diminish corporate governance provided by 
lending institutions. Debt covenants are 5ecured by fixed 
and floating charges over all assets and rank pari passu, an 
arrangement 1-.Jhich facilitates work-outs since individual 
lenders cannot gain a unique advantage. 
Case Studies 108 
7.6 Financial Performance 
ACL's EBIT on sales and assets ratios have exceeded the 
industry median by a large margin for each of the five post-
buyout years (Figure 7.1). These results indicate that ACL 
is able to maintain profit margins through all economic and 
business cycles, and that the company makes efficient use of 
its capital investments. Stable profit margins facilitate 
debt amortisation, particularly when floating rate debt is 
used, since cost increases can be passed on to consumers. 
Relatively high internal efficiency is predicted by theory 
since managerial and employee stock ownership reduce agency 
conflicts. 
Figure 7.1 
EBIT RATIOS 
Excess %-14~~~-------------------------------------. 
121----·-------------------------
10 1----·-------------------------
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!!!J!il EBIT /Sales tz221 EBIT I Assets 
Aut<Jmotiva Componenta Limited 
5 
ACL's employee productivity results are well below 
industry medians. Industry adjusted sales on employee ratios 
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are negative for each of the five post-buyout years, ranging 
from -531. (t+l) to -21'l. (t+2l and averaging -36'l. cverall. 
ACL's employee growth has been negligible, hence employee 
utilisation has been relatively inefficient. 
In contrast, profit on employee ratios have exceeded 
industry medians in all but the first post-buyout year. This 
suggests that the company has been successful in cutting 
operating and non-operating costs. These results are 
consistent with those reported by Muscarella et al. (1990). 
Table 7.2 discloses ACL's working capital management 
after adjusting fnr industry medians. It is evident that ACL 
have achieved strong EBIT and profitability results despite 
poor net working capital management. Shortening the cash 
cycle toward industry medians will provide a cheap source of 
short term finance, reducing costs and increasing 
performance measures. 
Table 7.2 indicates the greatest benefit could be 
achieved by reducing the number of days stock is warehoused, 
reflecting either poor production scheduling or weak 
marketing. Excess receivables collection periods may be 
attributable to weak credit and/or collection policies. 
Forgoing opportunities to reduce net working capital 
contrasts with results reported by Baker and Wruck (1989), 
and Smith (1990). 
Industry adjusted capital commitments on fixed assets 
ratios have been significantly positive for the post-buyout 
period. ACL has invested in new plant and equipment to 
9. 
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provide additional production capacity. This coincides with 
Muscarella et al. (1990) finding that leveraged buyouts 
purchase, as well as dispose of assets. 
Table 7.2 
Cash Cycle 
Industry Adjusted Days 1 2 3 4 5 
Inventot-y -17• -14 -23 -23 -37 
Receivables -14 -18 -15 -17 -19 
Creditors -11 - 7 -· 5 - 1 9 
Cash Cycle -41"' -39 -44"' -41 -47 
* Sum not exact due to rounding. 
A positive result indicates inventory and receivables days 
less than the industry median, and/or trade creditors days 
more than the industry median. 
a. Industry inventory (66) - ACL inventory (83) = -17. 
Therefore, Automotive Components Limited exhibited most 
of the attributes expected in a leveraged buyout target. The 
company resides in an industry which is mature, has low 
growth prospects, and low technological requirements, While 
the industry is subject to general economic cycles, ACL's 
strong market share, conventional brand name products, and 
broad range of products and markets, attenuates demand 
variation. 
ACL's ownership structure is consistent with intensive 
equity ownership among managers and specialists found in 
foreign research. The extent of the gearing in the capital 
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structure is more similar to UK, than US buyouts (Kitching, 
1989), Ownership and capital structures ensure cash flow 
generation is the firm's prime consideration. Ownership of 
equity and debt claims by AIDC Ltd is a derivative of strip 
financing and equity kickers used in the US/UK, to reduce 
conflicts of interest between stakeholders. 
ACL's strong EBIT and profitability ratios suggest cash 
flow incentives and rigorous corporate governance have 
alleviated internal conflicts and reduced costs. These gains 
were achieved despite relatively poor employee utilisation 
and net worki11g capital management. The comparatively large 
capital ex1•snditures imply gains are not realised at the 
expense of fUtu~e economic wealth. 
c. 
B. 1 Background 
Case Studies 
CHAPTER 8 
Leigh-Mardan Pty Ltd 
112 
DBSM Capital Partners Ltd acquired Leigh-Mardon from 
Amatil Limited in Septe~ber 1990. At a purchase price of 
S267.7M, Leigh-Mardon is the ' gest leveraged buyout 
completed in Australia. The company has remained privately 
owned. 
8. 2 Industry Characteri sties 
Leigh-Mardon manufacture flexible, metallised, carton 
and paper packaging; specialised formulated inks, credit and 
identity cards, EFTPOS and other electronic terminals. The 
company also prints cheques, stamps, encoded datagraphic 
forms, e>;am papers, ticketing, stationer-y~ Yellow Pages 
telephone directories and automotive manuals. 
Packaging and printing are mature industries with 
relatively stable underlying business fundamentals. 
Packaging and printing processes were established many years 
ago and are now well developed. In contrast, electronic 
terminal and datacard industries are relatively recent 
phenomena with ample scope for further development. 
Packaging, printing, electronic terminal and datacarC 
industries all exhibit growth potential. These industries 
benefit from significant scale economies such that modest 
increases in volume flow through to bottom line earnings. 
Given the recessed economy (1990) volumes could be expected 
to increase in ensuing years. Further 1 electronic terminal 
o. 
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and dataca~d applications were still being developed, hence 
large growth prospe~ts seemed likely. 
The above industries have strong demand under all 
economic conditions. The packaging industry services 
tobacco, food and beverage sectors which are essentially 
immune from general economic conditions. Similarly, printing 
and datacard industries are resilient to economic 
fluctuations since cheques, stamps, telephone directories 
and driver·s licences have inelastic demand. Hence, 
packaging, printing and datacard industries are non-
cyclical. 
The packaging and printing industries do not requ1re 
large expenditures on advanced technologies to remain 
competitive. They are conventional indust~ies with 
established technology and long p~oduction ~uns. Electronic 
terminal and dataca~d indust~ies ~equi~e investment in 
technology to ~efine existing products and develop new 
capabilities. 
Leigh-Mardon is predominantly exposed to printing 
(381.), packaging (48/.l and datacard indust~ies (8%). 
Printing and packaging industries satisfy tests of maturity, 
non-cyclical behaviour, and low technology requi~ements. 
These industries are conducive to leve~aged buyouts, a 
contention supported by Waite et al. (1989) relatively high 
pape~ (4.5) and p~inting (2,3) LEO-intensities. The datacard 
industry does not possess characteristics expected in LEOs. 
Howeve~, it does have potential for generating large amounts 
o. 
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of stable cash flow as outlined in the business attributes 
section. 
8.3 Business Attributes of the T~rget Company 
Leigh-Mardon is a dominant supplier in monopolistic and 
oligopolistic markets. The following two paragraphs outline 
market shares at the time of the buyout for divisions with 
sales exceeding $20M. 
The Domestic Cartons Division supplied 57% of the 
Australian tobacco market, which was well in excess of 
rivals, Gadsens (11/.) and Anzpac (32'l.). The division also 
controlled 70"/. of the beverages market in competition •.-.Jith 
APM and Visypak. The Flexibles Division dominated the 
confectionary (66/.) and snack foods (557.) markets, with 
Astrapak and 5-6 smaller companies being the only 
competitor-s. 
The Security Printing Division was the market leader in 
cheque printing business, accounting for 65/. of the market. 
Similarly, the Business Forms Division controlled 45/. of 
personalised cheques and airline ticketin~ business, with 
the only major competition coming fr-om Sands. The Datacard 
Division dominated the plastic cards market with a 60'l. 
markrat share. 
The aforementioned products m?.~· be characterised as 
mundane, with the exception of electronic terminals (which 
accounts for 31. of sale5). Packaging and printing products 
constitute the bulk of Leigh-Mardon·s sales and they are 
quite basic in their manufacture and ultimate end-use. 
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Leigh-Mardon had broad product and market 
diversification. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 delineate Leigh-
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Marden's sales by business segment when the leveraged buyout 
was completed. 
Figure 8.1 
TSD 2% 
lnkorp 4% 
LMPP Cartons 4% 
The diversified product and market range ensured Leigh-
Marden was not susceptible to technical obsolescence or 
market collapse. 
Therefore, Leigh-Mardon has strong market shares in 
basic product lines, with diversified products and markets. 
These attributes ensure a stable stream of cash flow is 
generated to amortise principal and interest obligations as 
they fall due. Hence, Leigh-Mardon has low business risk 
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capable of supporting the financial risk inherent in 
leveraged buyouts. 
Figure 8.2 
COMM. & SECURITY DIVISION 
Dataoard 17% 
Pacific 88 7% 
Fortronics 6% 
8.4 Equity Ownership 
Business Forms 18% 
Security 42% 
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Table 8.1 denotes equity ownership in the Leigh-Mardon 
leveraged buyout immediately after: (i) consummation, and 
(ii) warrants attached to debt instruments are exercised. 
Large equity stakes controlled by DBSM Capital Partners 
Ltd and Amatil Limited are consistent with improved 
managerial incentives and stringent corporate governance. 
DBSMs stake in the equity funding is not known, however, 
they have incentive to make the buyout work since their 
e. 
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ability to raise further equity capital at reasonable cost 
depends on the returns realised on invested funds. 
' 
Table 8.1 
Eguity Dwnersbi~ 
Fully Diluted 
Owner Cum/. "/. Cum/. 
DBSM Equity Fund 51 44 
DBSM Mezzanine Fund 51 12 56 
Am a ti 1 49 100 44 100 
8.5 Capital Structure 
The total debt and long term debt to assets ratios were 
B3'l. and 65'1., respectively. These ratios are similar to those 
reported by Muscarella et al. (1990) and Kuhn (1990), and 
they suggest that free cash flow would be dedicated to debt 
amortisation. 
The funding structure of the buyout was as follows: 
Senior Debt 
- Term Facilities 51.4 
- Working Capital 48.6 100.0 
Subordinated Debt 70.0 
Sale and Leaseback 53.7 
Equity 44.0 
Total $267.7M 
The mezzanine debt was not scheduled for principal 
payments within the first five post-buyout years, an 
D. 
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arrangement similar to the US experience of amortising 
senior debt prior to subor-dinated debt (Burke & Fi te, 1990). 
Using mezzanine debt with warrants attached (equity 
kickers) enables DBSM to reduce financial risk and improve 
marketability of debt instruments, Warrants reduce coupons 
paid on buyout debt, hence cash flow demands are minimised. 
Furthermore, warrants allow institutions to participate in 
shifts in the return distribution, providing equity returns 
in good times and facilitating improved agency relations in 
the event of default. 
DBSMs Mezzanine and Equity Funds give institutions the 
opportunity to invest in the Australian leveraged buyout 
market. DBSM benefits from these funds by limiting its LBO 
exposure to prudent levels, reducing deal completion times, 
and increasing the size range of potential LBO targets. If 
institutions contribute capital to both funds they would 
effectively be purchasing a strip of subordinated securities 
which encourages work-out arrangements similar to equity 
kickers. 
The projected financial capitalisation of Leigh-Mar-don 
as described in the deal proposal is denoted graphically in 
Figure 8.3. The financial capitalisation indicates that only 
marginal replacement of debt with equity is expected to 
occur within the f.~ve year post-buyout period. This may be 
attributable to los~es forecast for each year prior to t+5, 
a tax efficient result primarily due to large interest 
payments (Lowenstein, 1985). 
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Figure 8.3 
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Figure 8,4 depicts forecasted growth in market 
capitalisation for the five year post-buyout period at (EBIT 
x 8). This graph accentuates the expected increase in equity 
market value as cash flow pays down debt, offering investors 
a compounded return of 42/. per annum for the five ·vear 
holding period. 
' ' 
0. 
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CHAPTER 9 
McEwans Limited 
9.1 Background 
Based in Victoria since 1852, McEwans was publicly 
listed in 1951, and taken over by Repco Corporation Ltd in 
1982. In 1986, McEwans was purchased by Charles Davis 
Limited for $62M. After acquiring Lloyds Hardware Stores 
($20.9M) and Campbells Hardware and Timber Stores ($28M), 
McEwans was divested for a total consideration of $210M 
(January 1990), the second largest leveraged buyout in 
Australia. 
The McEwans buyout experienced problems since inception 
and a receiver manager was appointed in August i992. 
9.2 Industry and Busjness Characteristics 
McEwans was the second largest corporate hardware chain 
in Australia. Industry and business attributes referred to 
in Chapt~r Three mainly apply to manufacturing companies and 
hence, are less appropriate for retailing. For example, 
industry maturity and technology tests ensu~e large capital 
and R&D expenditures are not required to match developments 
introduced by competitors. Retailers however, do not have 
long term investments in productive assets to protect. 
As a durable goods retailer McEwans is susceptable to 
the economic cycle. Cyclical sales are not desirable since 
declining cash flow cannot service large outstanding debt 
commitments. Furthermore, additional capital is required 
a. 
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during boom conditions, diverting scarce cash resources from 
debt amortisation. 
Waite and Fridson's (1989) retail trade LEO-intensity 
ratio (2.3) indicates reasonably high retail industry 
exposure to leveraged buyouts in the United States. 
Easterwood et al. (1989) found the retailing sector had the 
most leveraged buyouts ()$100M). 
McEwans is a significant retailer in the hardware 
market, with major competition from BBC Hardware and Mitre 
Ten. The company established strong market share through 
aggressive expansion and the development of a fully 
automatic perpetual inventory and price lock-up computer 
system. However, readily ~vailable substitutes cause price 
competition, hence cost increases cannot be passed on to 
consumers. Therefore, McEwans real profit margins decline at 
the same time costs of floating rate debt increase. 
Hardware products are mundane such that stock is 
unlikely to become obsol~te or spoil on the shelves. McEwans 
had broad product and market diversification at the time of 
the buyout. 
Therefore, the McEwans leveraged buyout was vulnerable 
to eronomic downturns, despite having low technological 
requirements, mundane products with long shelve lives, and 
diversified products and markets. The recession caused low 
sales volumes which had a major impact on the buyout's nebt 
servicing capacity. 
D. 
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9.3 EQujty Ownership 
The McEwans leveraged buyout ownership structure is 
outlined in Table 9.1, both before and after warrants are 
exercised. The diluted position assumes management achieve 
performance targets. 
Table 9.1 
Equity Ownership 
Fully Diluted 
Owner 1. Cum/. 'l. Cum% 
Citicorp, AIDC, Mcintosh 62 53 
Charles Davis 30 92 27 80 
Scandanavian Pacific 92 4 84 
Management Group 8 100 16 100 
NB. Charles Davis owned 25,000 redeemable 'A' preference 
shares which carried no dividend or voting rights. 
The seven senior executives held 2.8M ordinary and 4.0M 
'8' redeemable preference shares with the right to be isr11ed 
ordinary shares. The rights were subject to performance 
targets being met: 
(i) The right to exchange 2.0M preference shares for 
ordinary shares on a 1:1 basis at a rate of 201. per annum, 
provided minimum EBT targets are achieved. There is a 
sliding scale if EBT targets are below specified levels. 
(ii) The right to subscribe for 2.0M ordinary shares on a 
1:1 basis at crystallisation date according to a sliding 
scale, commencing when ordinary shareholders receive an IRR 
c. 
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36.51. with the maximum entitlement when shareholders receive 
an IRR 40%. Preference shares will be redeemed at par 
{$0.20). 
These performance incentive schemes are similar to 
those recorded in Eaker and Wruck (1989). They reported 
sliding scales based on EBIT and average working capital 
ratios for OM Scott and Company, with payoffs offered 
between the range 80%-125/. of performance targets. 
The combination of sig:1~ficant managerial equity 
ownership and material incentive remuneration schemes 
motivates achievement of performance targets and emphasise 
cash flow generation. The LBO specialist equity sta!;e is 
consistent with stringent corporate governance (Jensen, 
1989). 
9.4 Capital Structure 
The McEwans capital structure consisted of four 
distinct layers: (i) senior secured, (ii) subordinated 
(mezzanine) debt, (iii) preferred stock, and (iv) common 
stock, as outlined below. 
Senior Bill/Advance Facility 
Senior Subordinated Notes 
Junior Subordinat 
Preferred Stack: A 
Common Stock 
Total 
8 
Debt 
92.0 
35.0 
25.0 
25.0 
0.8 
32.2 
$210.0M 
0. 
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The total debt to assets and long term debt to assets 
ratios were both 72/.. The senibr credit amounts to only 44/. 
of the capital structure, significantly below the 60/. ratio 
reported by Kuhn (1990). Therefore, McEwans raised a higher 
proportion of me~zanine finance (29/.) at a cost of 400 basis 
points over the 5 year swap rate, a considerably hi~her rate 
than bank debt. 
When the buyout was initiated the senior subordinated 
notes were held by AIDC Ltd (36"1.), Ch . =~.rles Davis Ltd (36/.), 
and Scandanavian Pacific (28/.). Each of the 70 notes had 
65,800 equity warrants attached. Hence the buyout reduced 
immediate cash flow demands by offering equity kickers. Debt 
interest charges would be lower with attached warrants since 
they allow participation in shifts in the return 
distribution. 
Equity kickers facilitate work-out arrangements in the 
event of default since gains from debt collection create 
losses in the equity position (Arzac:, 1992). This is 
reinforced by the fact that AIDC and Charles Davis both held 
equity positions in the buyout in de facto 5trip financing 
arrangements. 
Therefore, the McEwans buyout capital structure 
contained strip financing and equity kickers as a means of 
reducing direct financing costs and costs associated with 
bankruptcy. However, with price competition and a 
substantial portion of buyout funding represented by 
•• 
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subordinated debt at high floating rates, debt servicing 
capacity proved tenuous in the recession. 
The failure of the McEwans buyout has been partially 
attributed to insufficient retailing representation on the 
board of directors and managerial unwillingness to dispose 
of assets as the recession deepened (Dobbie, 1992), 
•• 
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The Adventure World (Bibra Lake Unit Trust) leveraged 
buyout resulted from the receivership of Galdarm Pty Ltd 
(Trustee). The receiver manager put Adventure World out for 
tender, and Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd and a 
management group responded with a $3.65M buyout proposal, in 
September 1990. 
10.2 Industry Characterjstjcs 
Adventure World is Perth's largest theme park, 
providing a wide variety of entertainment and attractions. 
The park h~s over 26 different rides, Australia'(3 largest 
swimming pool, a wildlife park, exploration cinema, animal 
circus, lakes, gardens and full public amenities. 
The Australian theme park indust~y is in the e~~Jy 
stages of its development. Aust~alians have not been ~egula~ 
pat~ons of theme pa~ks, howeve~, innovative ma~keting has 
made some p~og~ess with consume~ attitudes. Collie~s 
Inte~national believe the indust~y·s immatu~ity offe~s 
medium te~m g~owth p~ospects. Changing tastes and expected 
inc~eases in tou~ism p~omote g~owth in the West Australian 
theme pa~k indust~y. 
The theme pa~k industry is exposed to seasonal and 
climatic conditions. Summe~ months account fo~ a 
dispropo~tionately la~ge share of cash flow, while pa~ks are 
essentially closed over ·winte~ months (Figure 10.1). 
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Furthermore, inclement weather severely reduces attendance 
figures, potentially affecting lucrative prime season sales. 
Figure 10.1 
ATTENDANCE 
~No=-~o~I~P=•t=ro=n=a~(T=h=o=u•=•=n=d•=l-------------------------, 160, 
2 3 4 
Season (Summer ., 1) 
~ 198617 IZ22i1987/8 llHII, 1988/9 
Ac:lv-"!ntura World 
The theme park industry does not have extensive 
technology requirements since its fixed assets are 
insensitive to technical obsolescence. The industry requires 
capital expenditures however, to introduce new attractions 
at the commencement of each year to induce repeat patronage. 
Therefore, the theme park industry does not meet 
theorised leveraged buyout criteria reported in the 
literature. The industry is immature, exhibits medium term 
growth prospects, and suffers from seasonal and climatic 
conditions. Hence, cash flow generation is irregular and may 
be dissipated in growth periods. Notably, the Easterwood et 
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al. (1989), Waite and Fridson (1989) studies do not find 
leveraged buyouts in the US entertainment industry. 
l.Q.'....:L..BJ,Jsiness Attributes of the Target 
Adventure World is the premier theme park in West 
Australia, operating in a duopoly with Underwater World. 
Adventure World has a greater ability to entertain for 
lengthy periods and attract r-epeat patronage. The closure of 
Atlantis Marine Park, Action Park and the scaling down of El 
Caballo Blanco, combined with high est~blishment costs, 
augments Adventure World's dominant market share. 
Figure 10.2 delineates estimated attendance figures for 
specific client groups. While some diversity exists, 
Adventure World remains dependent on the fortunes of the 
local economy. 
Therefore, Adventure World's dominance of the local 
theme park industry insulates the trust from predatory 
pricing and other competitive threats. Furthermore, certain 
financial traits of Adventure World were favourable for a 
leveraged buyout transaction: 
(i) The trust had tax loss carry forwards amounting to 
$720,000 in t-1. 
(ii) The trust had operating losses in t-3, t-2, and t-1, 
however, cash flow was significantly positive in each year 
due to high non-cash (depreciation & amortisation) charges. 
(iii) With a three year average pre-buyout total debt to 
assets ratio of 391., the trust had considerable excess debt 
capacity. 
Family 
19% 
10.4 Equity O~qnership 
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Equity ownership was apportioned between the Management 
Group (38%) and Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd (62%). 
These equity ownership percentages provide management with 
material incentives to increase firm value and they promote 
effective corporate governance by the LBO specialist. Hence, 
the Adventure World leveraged buyout ownership structure was 
analogous to those reported in US and UK research. 
10.5 Capital Structure 
· The total debt and long term debt to assets ratios were 
both 82%, a result similar to those reported by Kitching 
(1989), Smith (1990) and Muscarella et al. (1990). Senior 
debt constituted 63% of the capital structure, closely 
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resembling US buyouts (~uhn, 1990; Vernick, 1991). Senior 
debt reduces agency costs since collateralised debt requires 
less monitoring. Similarly, leased assets remain the 
property of the lessor, providing default protection with 
low monitoring cost~. The deal funding was structured as 
follows: 
Senior Term Loan Facility 
Leasing 
Mezzanine Debt 
Ordinary Equity 
Total purchase price 
2,300,000 
354' 550 
350,000 3,004,550 
650' 000 
$3,654,550 
Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd supplied the 
mezzanine component of the debt funding through a trading 
vuhicle, SGJ Investments Pty Ltd. Given that "they own 6B'l. of 
the ordinary equity capital their Adventure World portfolio 
approximates a strip financing arrangement. 
Therefor-e, the Adventure World leveraged buyout capital 
structure employs financing techniques consistent with 
foreign buyout research. 
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CHAPTER 11 
Summary and Conclusion 
Australian leveraged buyouts are not expected to 
satisfy all theoretical propositions regarding industry and 
business attributes, or ownership and capital structures. 
Rather, the firm·s overall level of business risk should 
support a high degree of financial risk (Burke & Fite, 
19901. 
The case studies in this thesis suggest that industry 
and business attributes synonymous with US and UK buyouts 
are important determinants of Australian leveraged buyouts. 
Firm specific factors were the primary motivating forces, 
with the industry being a secondary or contributing factor. 
This result is consistent with Ambrose and Winters (1992). 
Most of the industries occupy mature sectors of the 
economy and have lr,w technology requirements. However, 
approximately half the industries have growth prospects or 
cyclical sales. In contrast to the mixed industry results, 
all firms have leading market shares or strong market 
niches, relatively mundane products (except Adventure 
World), and broad product or market diversification. 
Therefore, business attributes appear more influential than 
industry traits when analysing business risk. The case 
results imply that stable cash flow is important in 
Australian leveraged buyouts. 
The cases disclose equity ownership structures 
analogous to those reported in the US and UK. Although 
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equity ownership levels vary according to deal size and 
complexity, managers and specialists account for material 
ownership interests. The concentration of equity ownership 
motivates managers to increase firm value and hence, the 
value of residual claims on the firm's assets (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Specialists have the incentive and 
resources to effectively monitor managerial performance 
(Jensen, 1989). 
The substantial employee equity ownership in Centurion 
Industries Limited (471. initially, 321. fully diluted) is 
consistent with agency theory. Centurion's t-:ighly unianised 
workforce was required to improve performance to turn the 
company around, hence participation in residual claims on 
the firm's assets should motivate workers. 
The minority equity stakes held by parent companies in 
the t.eigh-Mardon Pty Ltd and McEwans Limited buyouts, 
enables vendor participation in expected future gains, 
effectively increasing the acquisition price received. Given 
that these are Australia's largest leveraged buyouts, vendor 
equity ownership may have lent credibility to the 
transactions {Wright et al., 1991). 
The capital structures of the six cases predictably 
(and by definition) had large gearing levels. The Australian 
buyouts had capital structures which were more closely 
aligned with those reported in UK research (Kitching, 1989; 
Wright et al. 1991). That is, with total debt and long term 
debt to assets ratios averaging 78% and 65/. respectively, 
D. 
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the Australian buyouts were toward the more conservative end 
of the international spectrum. 
Mezzanine finance was utilised by all three 1990 
buyouts, but not by the mid-l.980s buyouts. This probably 
reflects the state of knowledge which prevailed at those 
times and/or the relatively late development of subordinated 
debt markets in Australia. With mezzanine layers 
representing 261. and 29% of total deal funding, Leigh-Mardon 
Pty Ltd and McEwans Limited closely resemble the 30/. level 
typical of leveraged buyouts in the United States (Paulus & 
Waite, 1990). 
Strip financing and/or equity kickers were present in 
the four mast recent Australian leveraged buyouts. The st~ip 
financing ranged from the provision of subordinated debt and 
equity from a single source (Adventure World) to DBSM LBO 
funds representing numerous institutional clients (Leigh-
Marden). Strip holders receive rights to intercede in the 
leveraged buyout as each security d~faults, and accordingly, 
have little incentive to transfer wealth (Jensen, 1986). 
The Leigh-Mardon and McEwans buyouts used equity 
warrants to increase marketability of subordinated debt and 
reduce cash outflows. Warrants attached to subordinated debt 
use capital gains from expected firm value increases to 
offset interest demands of mezzanine investors (Arzac, 
1992). Equity kickers facilitate lower agency costs since 
they attenuate conflicts of interest between debt and equity 
holders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Summary and Conclusion 135 
Figure 11.1 synthesises industr~ adjusted EBIT/Sa1es 
ratios for each of the mid-1980s buyouts analysed in this 
thesis. It is evident that while all three buyouts exceed 
their respective industry medians in each post-buyout year, 
Centurion and ACL have realised higher profit margins per 
dollar of sales. 
Figure 11.1 
EBIT/SALES RATIOS 
Excess% 16~~~----------------------------------~ 
2 3 4 5 
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Similarly, industry adjusted EBIT/Total assets ratios 
exceed their respective industry medians in each post-buyout 
year, which suggests the buyout companies have achieved 
relatively high operating efficiency. 
Therefore, case evidence supports the proposition that 
leveraged buyout companies produce comparatively strong EBIT 
performance. The indifferent Joyce results may reflect the 
findings of the industry and business attributes tests which 
'· 
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proved Joyce was the most atypical (of the three mid-1980s 
LBOs) buyout candidate. 
Centurion and ACL employee ratio results are consistent 
with the conclusions of large sample studies (Muscarella et 
al., 1990; Lichtenberg et al., 1990), Industry adjusted 
profit per employee ratios were significantly positive 
despite poor employee efficiency utilisation. Cost control, 
rather than increased sales, accounted for most of the 
buyout gains. Joyce industry adjusted employee ratios were 
mediocre for mast of the post-buyout period, due to problems 
associated with merging other business units into their 
operations and recession induced layoffs. 
Figure 11.2 indicates that Centurion, Joyce and ACL do 
not manage their working capital efficiently o~ effectively. 
These results contrast markedly with those reported by 
Maupin et al. (1984), Baker and Wruck (1989), Singh (1990), 
and Smith (1990). 
There is a strong inverse relationship between the 
length of the cash cycle and the EBIT/Total assets ratios, 
The decline in Centurion·s EBIT/Total asset ratios 
corresponds with an increase in the length of the cash 
cycle, and vice versa for Joyce. Reducing the cash cycle 
toward industry medians provides a source of low cost 
finance which minimises working capital investments and 
demands on cash flow. 
Industry adjusted capital commitments on fixed assets 
ratios are consistent with the Muscarella et al. (1990) 
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assertion that LBOs do not sacrifice long term capital 
investments to increase debt servicing capacity. Centurion 
and ACL both invested in productive assets in the post-
buyout period. 
Figure ll. 2 
CASH CYCLE 
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Therefore, the evidence from the six Australian case 
studies analysed in this thesis is consistent with the 
agency theory framework established in Chapter Two. The 
positive industry adjusted post-buyout performance mainly 
resulted from cost disciplines, which complies with 
expectations of reduced agency costs due to realigned 
managerial incentives and effective corporate governance. 
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CHAPTER 12 
Future Research on Australian LBOs 
The following suggestions for future research on 
Australian leveraged buyouts are a logical extension of this 
thesis. 
12~1 Organisation Structure 
This thesis has confirmed that the theoretical 
framework which .pertains to foreign (US & UK) leveraged 
buyouts is applicable to the domestic market. Foreign 
research found the revised capital, ownership and asset 
structures induced concomitant organisational reform. 
Australian research into the organisation changes that 
result from leveraged buyouts should focus on the following 
issues; 
(i) The composition of the Board of Directors as a proxy for 
the specialist's centralised control over strategic decision 
making (Easterwood et al., 1989). It would be interesting to 
compare other buyouts with McEwans, given a Board stacked 
with financial executives was cited as a reason for the 
retailers's eventual demise (Dobbie, 1992). 
(ii) The change (if any) in corporate hierarchy and/or lines 
of communication, as an estimate of the decentralisation of 
operating decisions and elimination of excess bureaucracy 
expected in leveraged buyouts (Easterwood et al. 1989; 
Lichtenberg et al., 1990; Muscarella et al., 1990). 
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(iii) The extent to whi~h executive remuneration contracts 
incorporate bonus schemes and emphasise the maximisation of 
firm value (Baker & Wruck, 1989; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). 
12.2 The legal and Institutional Framework 
This thesis has reviewed academic and trade literature 
which predominantly emanates from the United States. The 
legal and institutional arrangements that facilitated the 
development of their advanced leveraged buyout market, may 
or may not be present in Australia. Research into the 
infrastructure of Australian leveraged buyouts should 
consider the points enumerated below: 
(i) The deductibility of debt interest under the Income Tax 
Assessment Act. Particular emphasis should be placed on the 
taxation of deferred interest securities, employee stock 
ownership plans (ESOPs), and limited partnerships. Taxation 
provisions that negatively affect these financing vehicles 
may impede LBO market development. 
(ii) Provisions of Corporations Law which relate to self 
dealing (s1002), share-buybacks (s205), and director/officer 
fiduciary duties of care (s232), may affect management 
participation in leveraged buyouts. 
(iii) The effect of Stamp Duty on the structuring of 
leveraged buyouts CiS a share or asset purchase, and the 
eventual buyout vehicle used (~,hell company, single/multi-
tier) • 
(iv) The factors which bear on the development of an 
Australian subordinated debt market. This would include the 
c 
Future Research 140 
securitisation of mezzanine funds to improve liquidity and 
marketabi I i ty, and the wi 11 ingness of fund mrcnager-s to buy 
such paper (Madden & Balestrino, 1990; Levi & Bencivenga, 
1990 I. 
D. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix A 
Performance Ratjos Used in LBO Case Studies 
1. EBIT/SALES and EBIT/ASSETS 
154 
These are calculated by dividing reported earnings 
before interest and tax, by gross sales or total assets, 
respectively. 
2. SALES/EMPLOYEES 
These are calculated by dividing gross sales by the 
total number of employees. 
3. PROFIT/EMPLOYEES 
The profit measure used in this calculation is net of 
any preference dividends and minority interests. 
4. DAYS RECEIVABLES, INVENTORY, CREDITORS 
Year end trade debtors, inventory, and trade creditors 
are multiplied by 365, and divided by gross sales. 
5, CASH CYCLE 
CC = days receivables + days inventory - days creditors. 
6. CAPITAL COMMITMENTS/FIXED ASSETS 
Capital commitments a~e exp~essed as a pe~centage of 
yea~ end ~i)c• assets. 
~. 
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Appendix B 
E..i.on and Industry Ratios 
Table 81 
C:eo:t~.u: :i,go I DJ:!.u~tr:: i~s Limi±.~d 
Centurion Industries 1 2 3 4 5 
EBIT/Sales C% I 21.4 20.0 20.2 16.1 7.6 
EBIT/T.Assets ( i'. ) 19.8 19.9 18.7 15.2 9.0 
Sales/Employees ($0001 68.6 71.2 85.1 80.0 138.6 
Profit/Employees ($001 59.4 59.9 81.9 65.7 52.8 
Days Cr-editor-s 26.7 27.9 28.8 22.7 25.8 
Days Receivables 69.4 61.8 87.3 65.8 65.6 
Days Inventory 40.2 47.9 53.5 66.8 57.9 
Capital commit./F.Assets 3.8 0.0 o.o 1.6 o.o 
Table 82 
JC:iC~ Cct:!:lct:a:t:.ico L.imi:t.cd 
Joyce Corporation 1 2 3 4 5 
EBIT/Sales C% I 12.1 7.8 9.3 6.7 6.0 
EBIT/T .Assets (%I 16. 1 11.0 5.6 11.1 10.6 
Sales/Employees ($0001 57.2 67.4 38.2 116.4 182.6 
Profit/Employees ($00) 21.1 15.9 16.9 20.8 19.5 
Days Cr-editors 32.7 30.9 100.2 37.9 33.4 
Days Receivables 71.9 54.1 93.9 43.5 40.8 
Days Inventory 82.8 82.3 161.9 45.2 43.5 
Capital commit./F.Assets 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
c. 
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Table 83 
9~l:tQOOQi i ~E COOOIJ!JDED±S Limited 
Automotive Components 1 2 3 4 5 
EBIT /Sales 1%1 12.9 16.0 15.6 14.3 11.2 
EBIT /T .Assets I %1 15.8 15.8 15.4 14.5 10.4 
Sales/Employees ($000) 67.6 81.1 84.9 89.1 87. 1 
Profit/Employees ($00) 28.6 31.7 38.6 39.1 12. 1 
Days Creditors 44.9 37.3 23 .! 23.9 31.6 
Days Receivables 62.4 60.9 60.4 56.4 57.9 
Days Inventory 83.1 77.9 77.9 86.2 98.8 
Ca. pi tal commit./F.Assets 11.3 10.1 12.5 11.1 8.5 
Table 84 
Iodu~tcll BEPQI:± ~c. ll 
Engineering (Median) 1 2 3 4 5 
EBIT /Sales I% I 6.3 7.6 7.8 7.1 4.6 
EBJT /T .Assets I%) 8.2 9.2 9.9 10.9 8.1 
Sales/Emp 1 oyees ($000) 92.4 100.8 111 .6 130.7 133.4 
Profit/Employees 1$00) 22.9 32.8 44.9 36.5 27.7 
Days Cr-editors 35.9 36.4 34.6 32.7 27.7 
Days Receivables 60.0 61 • .1 63.2 59.8 49.5 
Days Inventory 71.5 67.0 63.5 67.4 65.4 
Capital commit./F.Assets 1.0 1.4 0.6 0.1 o.o 
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Table 85 
Iodus:tt:::l BE!P!:!t::t ~Q. 22 
Misc. Industrials (Median) 1 2 3 4 5 
EBIT/Sales ( 'l. I 5.7 7.6 3.4 5.2 5.9 
EBIT/T.Assets (%I 7.3 9.5 4.3 7.4 6.2 
Sales/Employees ( $000) 128.3 120.5 102.4 107.6 122.9 
Profit/Employees ($00) 24.2 32.1 4.9 24.9 20.8 
Days Creditors 35.7 33.9 30.3 28.5 24.9 
Days Receivables 51.8 48.4 42.9 45.6 39.3 
Days Inventory 61.2 66. 1 63.9 56.6 63.6 
Capita 1 commit./F.Assets 0.7 0. 1 0.0 0.6 0.5 
